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than half of the case-law relating to civil service administration has arisen out of restrictions on the removal
power that appear "both substantively and procedurally in every
state civil service law."' Security of tenure conditioned on satisfactory work is of first importance in any adequate civil service
system. It has been suggested
"that when the state undertakes the management of business properly so called, and business which hitherto has been carried on by
each individual citizen simply with a view to his own interest, the
ORE

government . . . will be found to need that freedom of action

necessarily possessed by every private person in the management
of his own personal concerns."But the answer is at least threefold.
In the first place, it has long been too apparent that an unlimited removal power is exercised from motives entirely unrelated to the reasons calling for it as a strictly business proposition;3 and the axe frequently falls upon the very ones whom the
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'Rice, The Function of the Courts in Enforcing the Wisconsin Civil
Service
Law, (1933) 2 Wis. L. Rev. 257, 261.
2
Dicey, Development of Administrative Law in England, (1915) 31
Law Q. Rev. 148, 150. See also Sykes v. City of Minneapolis, (1913) 124
Minn. 73, 76-77, 144 N. W. 453, 454-455: "A great deal might be said in
favor of legislation which gives the city council free hand to remove a
superintendent, manager or agent in the city waterworks for the efficient
and economical conduct of which, as a business proposition, the council is
held responsible... We have no doubt that the legislature intends to give
municipalities authorized to own and manage public utilities the same freedom and opportunities to make the ventures successful as if owned and
managed by private corporations or parties." But compare State ex rel.
Village of Chisholm v. Bergeron, (1923) 156 Minn. 276, 279-280, 194 N. W.

624, 625, involving a statute providing for a board of three water commis-

sioners appointed by the council but with no provision relating to their
removal. An antecedent general charter clause authorized the council to
remove all officers appointed or elected by it "whenever, in its judgment, the
public welfare will be promoted thereby." The court held that the statute,
in requiring first appointments for one, two, and three years respectively and
thereafter a new three-year appointment each year, and in providing that
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economic self-interest of the private employer would require him
to retain. Second, "As government becomes more complex, permanent officials become more and more necessary."' 4 The very
fact that government has invaded the realm formerly preempted to
private business calls all the more for the carrying on of its functions as far as possible on a strictly business basis divorced from
politics.5 The more complex government becomes, the more difficult it is to replace the advantage of long experience in an administrative task either easily or quickly, and even with superior
native talent.8 Third, aside from the merits or demerits of the
expansion of governmental activities and the conceded desirability of carrying on essentially business activities by business
each member of the board be president during the last year of the term
of his appointment, "indicates stability, and negatives the thought that a
commissioner is subject to removal at the will of the council. .

.

. We

think the manifest object of the legislature was to place the conduct of
municipal owned enterprises in the hands of a stable and independent body
free from the baneful influences which so often result from the frequent
changes of the political complexion of an elective village council."
The State Reorganization Act of 1925 (1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats. ch.
3A) centers state administration in a department of administration and
finance of three members responsible to and removable at will by the governor (sec. 53-5); and provides that "Except as herein otherwise provided
...The term of office or employment of all state employes shall be at the
pleasure of the appointing officer" (sec. 53-48). For its nature, purposes
and scope see State ex rel. Kinler v. Rines, (1931) 185 Minn. 49, 51-52, 239
N. W. 670, 671; State ex rel. University of Minnesota v. Chase, (1928) 175
Minn. 259, 262, 220 N. W. 951, 952; State ex rel. Yapp v. Chase, (1925)
165 Minn. 268, 276, 206 N. W. 396, 399; Young. Reorganization of Administrative Branch of Minnesota Government, (1925) 10 MINNESOTA LAW
REVIEW 40.

$See Sullivan, Our New Spoils System, (1936) 157 Atlantic Monthly
189; and compare the Wilmeth and other removals by President Harding,
see 40th Report of the U. S. Civil Service Commission, 1922-1923, 152-153:
41st Report, 1923-1924, 105; Wilmeth v. United States, (1928) 64 Ct. CIs.
368; MacMahon, Selection and Tenure of Bureau Chiefs in the National
Administration of the United States, (1926) 20 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 548, 568,
770.
4
Lowden, Permanent Officials in the National Administration, (1927)
21 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 529, 531, pointing out further that the "political" or
"policy determining" chief- of a department cannot well serve his proper
function of bringing to bear "the viewpoint of the public as to the results
which are expected of the department," "unless he be relieved of the details
of administration," which cannot be unless the department is otherwise
organized, including an administrative chief, on a permanent basis.
5
State ex rel. Village of Chisholm v. Bergeron, (1923) 156 Minn. 276,
279-280, 194 N. W. 624, 625; see also Mitchell, Merit Versus Spoils in
Public Employment, (1933) 22 Nat. Mun. Rev. 492, 493.
"See Brown, The Administration of Workmen's Compensation 24:
"Unless the state wishes to install as commissioners and examiners persons
with formal technical education, which course would be prohibitively expensive, it is obvious that such expert knowledge as the commission now
possesses can be acquired only by long and continuous experience in office."
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methods, it must remain true that any social gains in fact
derived can never be evaluated entirely in dollars and cents.'
As public service inevitably bulks larger as a means of livelihood,
in attempting an evaluation either prospectively or retrospectively
of its utility the economic and human relations of the employees
cannot be overlooked. Their opportunities for self-help are less
than those of organized labor in private employment, 8 and if their
interests are to be protected at all it must be inevitably and almost
exclusively by legal means.9
There is the danger to be guarded against of veering too much
in the direction of making the public service a haven of safety
for the unfit when once in office, 10 or for the confirmed bureaucrat
whose mentality as well as methods have become static. Consequently a complete adjustment of all interests can never rest
solely on restrictions directed to the removal power, but must begin
with an adequate system for the making of appointments on a
strictly merit basis, and include an adequate scheme both of promotions and of disciplinary measures falling short of the final
1
drastic one of removal. 1
7See Finer, The Civil Service in the Modern State, (1925) 19 Am. Pol
Sci. Rev. 277, 278-279: "... . the state cannot be subjected to the commercial
tests by which the private producer is judged. No accurate way has yet
been invented of assaying the relationship between its output and its revenue.
... Since.. . it is impossible for the final product of the civil service to be
measured and controlled in anything like a satisfactory manner from the
outside and retrospectively, it is of the highest importance that only the
fittest shall be selected, that only the fittest shall be promoted, and that the
conditions of discipline, reward and civic rights shall promote an atmosphere
of contented
and zealous activity."
8
See Finer, The Civil Service in the Mfodern State, (1925) 19 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. at 283; White, Organization of Public Employees, (1921) 15 Am.
Pol. 9Sci. Rev. 267; 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 54; 5 U. S. C. A. sec. 652.
"Legal means," as is shown in the text, need not necessarily include
resort to "courts" in the constitutional "judicial" sense. On the "processes
of law" the constitutional courts have no monopoly. See MfcFarland, Administrative Agencies in Government and the Effect Thereon of Constitutional
Limitations, (1934) 20 A. B. A. Journ. 612, 613, 623.
20 See Anderson, Local Government and Finance in Minnesota 113,
noting that such a criticism has been made of the operation in practice
of the tenure provisions of the home rule charter of Minneapolis. But see
Gallagher, Public Personnel Problems and the Depression, (1933) 22 Nat.
Mun. Rev. 199, 200, 206, 214, suggesting that "In St. Paul and M inneapolis
the heavy cuts in appropriations for the civil service commissions were
said to be due to the hostility of certain councilmen to the merit system and
to effective personnel administration."
"'There should also be adequate provisions for transfer, to avoid friction resulting from the reinstatement of an employee with whom, even though
unjustifiably, the superior officer is dissatisfied. In all these respects Minnesota has as yet no adequate or unified civil service "system." Such as it has.
has grown up piecemeal, without correlation, and mainly around the removal power in particular situations discussed in the text. In New York
and Ohio a state 'civil service commission has general supervision over the
local commissions.
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Conceivably a complete adjustment need not include resort to
courts, if an adequate scheme of infra-administrative self-regulation is provided. Conceivably judicial interference does not provide an adequate solution from the point of view either of the
administrative service or of the employee; '2 and it may detract
from the stature of the courts. 13 For one reason, a court when
called upon to interfere in an isolated instance sees not the administrative problem steadily or as a whole, but only in its final drastic
aspect. In this respect a specialized administrative court devoted
exclusively to personnel problems would no doubt be more adequate than the common-law courts of general jurisdiction."4 And
there is nothing in the nature of the power of removal from public
office that inherently requires a "judicial" trial de novoll or even
"judicial" review." It has become commonplace that public office
12See Dimock, Forms of Control Over Administrative Action, Lssays
on the Law and Practice of Governmental Administration 297-298: "A very
small percentage of administrative acts ever conies before the courts ...
Judicial control of administrative conduct is . . . largely retroactive and
compulsive. Court decisions create standards regarding property rights,
but techniques, methods, and employee attitudes fail almost complete.y outside of judicial competence. The effect of judicial control is therefore more
personal than institutional, more negative than positive." That judicial
control is "more personal than institutional" is perhaps not entirely a point
of criticism. Compare, as to a problem bearing some analogy to the one
here under discussion, Stephens, What Courts Can Learn from Commissions, (1933) 19 A. B. A. Journ. 141, 144-159, note 16: "Administrative
machinery and procedure are ill-adapted to evaluation and disposition of the
human interests involved in alien deportation and exclusion cases. Grave
injustice has resulted from the commitment of this essentially judicial subject
to the field of administrative law."
1aSee McFarland, Administrative Agencies in Government and the
Effect Thereon of Constitutional Limitations, (1934) 20 A. B. A. Journ.
at 612: ".

.

. efforts to impose legal processes upon functions whicil are

not in their nature subject to the methods of law would reflect upon the
law itself." From the context of the article the author by "legal processes"
is referring to the methods of the constitutional judicial courts. The same
may have been the thought of Mitchell, J., in State ex rel. Mortense v.
Copeland, (1898) 74 Minn. 371, 376, 77 N. W. 221, 223, wherein lie defends
a result, rendering the first state veterans' preference law practically nugatory so far as judicial enforcement was concerned, as in part the consequence
of "the inherent nature of the subject of which it treats."
14See Dimock, Forms of Control Over Administrative Action, Essays
on the Law and Practice of Governmental Administration 298-314. As yet
such methods of infra-administrative control have not been tried out in the
United States to a sufficient extent to realize their full possibilities.
15Though compare Fugate v. Weston, (1931) 156 Va. 107, 112, 117,
157 S. E. 736, 738-739, 741: "To remove a man from office because of embezzlement, without giving him a day in court, runs counter to those fundamental instincts of fair dealing which lie at the base of all governments;"
noted (1931) 20 Nat. Mun. Rev. 539; (1932) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 106;
see also Pate, State Supervision of Local Fiscal Officers in Virginia, (1931)
25 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 1004, 1006.
16McFarland, Administrative Agencies in Government and the Effect
Thereon of Constitutional Limitations, (1934) 20 A. B. A. Journ. 612, 613,
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is no longer in any sense a "hereditament,""1 but is more in the
nature of a public trust exercisable only for the public good. '8 It
is consequently not a "vested" property or contract right of the
incumbent within the protection of the due process clauses of the
federal and respective state constitutions or the obligation of contract clause of the former.19
points out that the phrase "judicial review" involves four different meanings: "(1) the popular demand for a right of appeal of some sort, (2) the
professional demand for a right of appeal to judicial tribunals, (3) statutory
judicial powers over administration, and (4) judicial powers under the
Constitution of the United States and the constitutions of the several
states." In the problem here dealt with (4) is seldom involved, and (2)
is not noticeably present; conceivably (1) would suffice, and perhaps be
better served by appellate administrative tribunals than by courts in the
strictly judicial sense; however it is with judicial review in the third sense
that this study is chiefly concerned.
17That the "common law offices" were so regarded in England, see
State ex rel. Clapp v. Peterson, (1892) 50 Minn. 239, 243, 52 N. W. 655;
2 Blackstone, Commentaries, Christian's Ed., 36; 3 Kent, Commentaries,
8th ed., 567 et seq.; Mechem, Public Officers 295-296; Throop, Public
Officers 3, 18. Removal from other offices may originally, as a common law
principle, have required at least notice and hearing, see Throop, Public Officers 358. Dillon indicates that the power to remove municipal officers
may originally have been only in the whole corporation, in full meeting.
See Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 3d ed., 268.
' 8 See State ex rel. Clapp v. Peterson, (1892) 50 Minn. 239, 243, 52
N. W. 655; State ex rel. Childs v. Wadhams, (1896) 64 Minn. 318, 324,
67 N. W. 64, 67; State ex rel. Lull v. Frizzell, (1884) 31 Minn. 460, 467,
18 N. W. 316, 319.
19 See State ex rel. Lull v. Frizzell, (1884) 31 Minn. 460, 467, 18 N. W.
316, 319: "It is elementary that there is no contract, express or implied,
between a public officer and the government, whose agent he is, for the continuance of his office or the permanency of his salary for the full term for
which he was elected. Public officers have no proprietary interest in their
offices, or any right of property in the prospective compensation attached
thereto;" Taylor v. Beckham, (1894) 178 U. S.576-580, 20 Sup. CL 890,
44 L. Ed. 1187; State ex rel. Topping v. Houston, (1913) 94 Neb. 445,
452, 143 N. W. 796, 799; State ex rel. Buell v. Frear, (1911) 146 Wis. 291,
298-299, 131 N. W. 832, 833-834; Mechem, Public Officers 297; Throop,
Public Officers 345. An officer may acquire vested rights in a pension
fund, see Renz v. Hibbing Firemen's Relief Association, (1932) 186 Minn.
370, 372, 243 N. W. 713, 714; Stevens v. Minneapolis Fire Department Relief Association, (1914) 124 Minn. 381, 384, 145 N. W. 35, 36; cf. Lynch v.
United States, (1935) 292 U. S.571, 54 Sup. Ct.840, 78 L. Ed. 1434; and the
same would appear to be true of emoluments already earned by a de jure
officer so long as there are funds with which to pay him and the privilege
of suit exists. But that a de facto officer may not recover compensation in
Minnesota even for services actually performed, either on a contractual
or quasi-contractual basis, see Larsen v. City of St. Paul, (1901) 83 Minn.
473, 475, 86 N. W. 459; O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1898) 72 Minn. 256,
75 N. W. 375; Yorks v. City of St. Paul, (1895) 62 Minn. 250, 252, 64
N. W. 565; see also Stoner, Recovery of Salary by a De Facto Officer,
(1912) 10 Mich. L. Rev. 178, 291. Rights in public office or employment are
occasionally determined on a contractual basis, though not necessarily with
constitutional implications, wherever there is a contract of employment the
employing body was statutorily authorized to make. See Manley v. Scott,
(1909) 108 Minn. 142, 147-148, 121 N. W. 628, 629-630; Hong v. Independent
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Approached from the angle of the separation of powers in
government, the power of removal from public office appears to
be one of those matters "which from their nature do not require
judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it."2o

Confiding

it to the courts either in first instance or by way of review imposes
upon them no "non-judicial" function in a constitutional sense ;"1
on the other hand confiding it in first instance or even exclusively
to administrative officers or tribunals is not ordinarily subject to
the objection of conferring upon them a part of the constitutional
"judicial" power.-

Offices constitutionally created or recognized are subject to all
provisions prescribing the power of appointment to them and their
qualifications and tenure; and the power of the courts to enforce
2
these particularized constitutional mandates cannot be excluded.

1

School Dist. No. 245, (1930) 181 Minn. 309, 312-313, 232 N. W. 329, 330-331;
Backie v. Cromwell Consol. School Dist. No. 13, (1932) 186 Minn. 38, 40-41,
242 N. W. 389, 390-392; but compare Egan v. City of St. Paul, (1894) 57
Minn.20 1, 5, 58 N. W. 267, 269.
Van Devanter, J., in Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, (1929) 279 U. S.
438, 2451, 49 Sup. Ct. 411, 413, 73 L. Ed. 789.

'For the extent to which courts serve as tribunals of first instance for
this purpose, see Fairlie, Judicial and Administrative Control of County
Officers, (1930) 28 Mich. L. Rev. 250, 259-262; Kneier, Some Legal Aspects
of the Governor's Power to Remove Local Officers, (1931)
17 Va. L.
Rev. 355.
22
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Hawkins, (1886) 44 Ohio St. 98, 109,
5 N. E. 228, 232-233; State ex rel. Walters v. Oleson, (1886) 15 Neb. 247,
249-250, 18 N. W. 45, 46; though compare Fugate v. Weston, (1931) 156
Va. 107, 157 S. E. 736.
23
Article 7, section 7 of the Minnesota constitution establishes the qualifications of elective officers. "This is a denial of power to the legislature to
impose any greater restrictions or to add other qualifications for eligibility
to those prescribed by the constitution." State ex rel. Childs v. Holman,
(1894) 58 Minn. 219, 226, 59 N. W. 1006, 1007. "The constitutional provisions prescribing the qualifications for eligibility to office applies to all

elective offices-to those created by statute as well as to those created by
the Constitution." Hoffman v. Downs, (1920) 145 Minn. 465, 467, 177
N. W. 669, 670.
Article 5, section 4 of the constitution provides that the governor "shall
have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, . . . to
appoint . . . such . . . officers as may be provided by law." It has been
held thereunder that while the legislature may "create an office, and itself
appoint the officer thus provided for, or lodge the power of appointment elsewhere than with the chief executive," yet when it has brought the office
within the constitutional provision by providing for appointment by the
governor, the latter's power of appointment is vested in him by the constitution rather than by the statute creating the office, and any further provisions of the statute limiting his selection to a list provided by someone else
are invalid. State ex rel. Childs v. Griffen, (1897) 69 Minn. 311, 312-313.
72 N. W. 117, 118, where the legislature had attempted to limit tile governor's
appointment of five members of a state board of pharmacy to a list of fifteen
supplied by the state pharmaceutical association. "If he may be compelled
to select one of five persons named by a natural or artificial person, lie canl
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distinguished

from enforcing restrictions on the removal power, the courts will
continue to determine the extent to which a blanket grant of the
constitutional executive power may carry with it an absolute removal power that cannot be curtailed.2
Otherwise than in these

aspects, the problem is not a constitutional one; and herein legislative choice of the procedure calculated most effectively to secure
all interests concerned is allowed wide scope.

But the problem

is not dulled in its significance as a legal one by the fact that it
involves no vested rights in the constitutional sense, or by the

fact that within the separation of powers principle its administration may be confined to other agencies than "judicial" courts.
A tendency of minds wherein problems all too readily end as
well as begin in the constitution 25 is to depart too far from the conception with which the common law started out.2
All rights are
in the last analysis only privileges created by law, 27 which may
be done statutorily as well as constitutionally; and legislative no
less than constitutional wisdom may create or recognize interests

in their totality as deserving and socially no less than individually
significant, as ever have been the interests committed to the aegis
equally as well be obliged to choose as between two, or, for that matter, compelled to appoint without even exercising a discretion as between two ... we
do not intimate that the legislature . . . might not provide that appointees
to legislative offices, as distinguished from offices created and fixed by the
constitution, must possess certain qualifications."
Compare State ex rel.
Buell v. Frear, (1911) 146 Wis. 291, 131 N. W. 832.
As to the governor's power to remove elective officers authorized by the
legislature pursuant to article 13, section 2 of the constitution, the court has
said obiter in Sykes v. City of Minneapolis, (1913) 124 Minn. 73, 77, 144
N. W. 453, 455, that "There can be no doubt that all elective officers come
within this section, and that such may not be removed except for malfeasance
or nonfeasance
in office."
2
4See Myers v. United States, (1926) -72 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21, 71
L. Ed. 160, as limited by Rathbun v. United States, (1935) 295 U. S. 602,
55 Sup. Ct. 869, 79 L. Ed. 1710. For a most thoroughgoing analysis of the
decision in Myers v. United States, see Corwin, Tenure of Office and the
Removal
Power Under the Constitution, (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 353.
2
Compare Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power,
(1935) 19 MINFSOTA LAW RrvEw 261: "When once the courts have held
that the law in question does not transcend constitutional provisions, our
interest is apt to cease; the barriers are down, the propriety of the law is
proved, and future development proceeds in a planless manner, undisturbed
by doubts and questions." Compare also the extent to which the courts,
by finding the constitutional issue rather easy of solution, as in importation
and postal cases and the like, have failed to recognize that the whole problem
was not thereby solved. Buttfield v. Stranahan, (1904) 192 U. S. 470, 24
Sup. Ct. 349, 48 L. Ed. 525; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, (1904) 194
U. S. 497, 506, 29 Sup. Ct. 789, 48 L. Ed. 1092.
26See footnote 17.
27
See Pound, Theories of Law, (1912) 22 Yale L. J. 114, 140-146; Pound,
Interpretations of Legal History, 158-160.
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of due process clauses. 28 For the law to create or recognize the
individual public servant's economic interest in his job may minister even more to the larger interest of society generally in an
efficient and stable public service. An interest properly susceptible
of the application of legal rules is thus established; and in this
sense the courts that still occasionally assert that the incumbent
of public office has something "in the nature" of a "property"
right therein are perhaps not far wrong. 2 The facts are that in
most jurisdictions a considerable degree of control is either confided to or assumed by the courts.
Except by wholly rejecting the principle of civil tenure, compliance with restrictions placed upon the removal power cannot be
confided exclusively to the good faith of the officer or tribunal
exercising it; and review by an independent administrative tribunal,
if ever created specially for the purpose, need not necessarily involve fundamentally different legal rules or principles than those
now applied by courts. The substitution for "judicial" courts of
an "administrative" court of general supervision should retain at
least the function already served by the former, though providing
larger opportunity for experimentation in this field of social control. 0 The problem is therefore approached without predilection
either in favor of or against the province which the courts now
occupy in relation to it, but with the purpose of ascertaining the
extent to which they, as the only independent agencies of control
now supplied or available, achieve in behalf of all interests concerned the purpose of civil tenure where it has been provided.
28

See Field, The Study of Administrative Law: A Review and a
Proposal, (1933) 18 Iowa L. Rev. 233, 237-238, for a criticism of the overemphasis in the study and teaching of administrative law upon its constitutional aspects, and a recognition that "Some of the most provoking problems
of analytical law and governmental policy," as well as of the adequate securing
of human interests, concern the "status of the persons engaged in adninistration."29
See State ex rel. Childs v. Wadhams, (1896) 64 Minn. 318, 324, 67
N. W. 64, 67. The cases holding that as between a de facto officer who has
performed the services and a de jure claimant of the office, the latter is entitled to the salary thereof, indicate to that extent something very much
in the nature of a property right in the latter. See Markus v. City of Duluth,
(1917) 138 Minn. 225, 229, 164 N. W. 906, 908; Stoner, Recovery of Salary
by a De Facto Officer, (1912) 10 Mich. L. Rev. 178, 291-292.
3oSee McFarland, Administrative Agencies in Government and the Effect
Thereon of Constitutional Limitations, (1934) 20 A. B. A. Journ. 612, 623,
pointing out that as administrative tribunals acquire by experience "a competence comparable to the traditional ability of . . ,judges," and "the methods
of deliberation and decision" of courts, they themselves become "courts in
effect and in fact." "Administrative justice . . . [is] the trying groundthe subsidiary corporation so to speak-whereby the courts ... [avoid] some
of the embarrassments of experimentation in new fields of government."
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I. REMOVAL DIRECTLY By COURT ACTION
In Minnesota the courts do not serve as tribunals of first
3
instance for this purpose to the extent true in some jurisdictions. 1
Wherein they do consists chiefly in their exercise of the historic
function of the common-law writ of quo warranto.32 It may be
31
See Fairlie, Judicial and Administrative Control of County Officers,
(1930) 28 Mich. L. Rev. 250, 259-262; Kneier, Some Legal Aspects of the
Power to Remove Local Officers, (1931) 17 Va. L Rev. 355.
Governor's
32
The ancient writ of quo warranto is generally obsolete and an information in the nature of quo warranto its modern substitute. State ex rel. Clapp
v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co., (1889) 40 Minn. 213, 215, 41 N. V. 1020,
1021; State ex rel. Wetzel v. Tracy, (1892) 48 Minn. 497, 499-500, 51 N. W.
613. It may issue directly from the supreme court, see 1 Mason's 1927 Minn.
Stat., sec. 132; or from the district court, see 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat.,
sec. 156, "as the court of general original jurisdiction, the historical successor of the Court of King's Bench." State ex rel. Young v. Village of
Kent, (1905) 96 Minn. 255, 256, 104 N. W. 948. Jury trial is not required,
State ex rel. Clapp v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co., (1889) 40 Minn. 213,
217, 41 N. W. 1020, 1022; nor could it constitutionally be required where the
writ issues directly from the supreme court, see Lauritsen v. Seward, (1906)
99 Minn. 313, 323, 109 N. W. 404, 408 (mandamus); State ex rel. Colter
v. Burr, (1881) 28 Minn. 40, 43, 8 N. W. 899, 900 (mandamus).
In the supreme court the writ is discretionary even when applied for by
the attorney general, and in the district courts when applied for by a private
relator, see State ex rel. Yomg v. Village of Kent, (1905) 96 Minn. 255, 257,
104 N. W. 948, 949; State ex rel. Bell v. Moriarty, (1900) 82 Minn. 68-69,
84 N. W. 495, 496; State ex rel. Simpson v. Dowlan, (1885) 33 Minn. 536,
537, 24 N. W. 188, 189. Where the writ issues originally from the supreme
court the practice is to atppoint a referee to take the evidence, and the controversy is submitted for the court's determination upon his report and the
pleadings. See State ex rel. Young v. Ladeen, (1908) 104 Mfinn. 252, 116
N. W. 486. Where the attorney general prosecutes the writ the burden of
proof is thrown upon the respondent. See State ex rel. Douglas v. Gylstrom,
(1899) 77 Minn. 355, 357, 79 N. W. 1038, 1039. In the discretion of the court,
depending on the extent of the public interest involved, the writ may be
prosecuted by a private relator claiming title to the office of which the
respondent is in possession, in which case "There are two separate and dissimilar interests allowed to be united in this action," and the judgment may
not only oust the respondent but also install the relator and award him
damages for the usurpation of his rights. Territory of Minnesota ex rel.
Parker v. Smith, (1859) 3 Minn. 240 (Gil. 164, 166) ; see also State ex rel.
Childs v. Marr, (1896) 65 Minn. 243, 69 N. W. 8; State ex rel. Childs v.
Wadhams, (1896) 64 Minn. 318, 325, 67 N. W. 64, 67. Though there were
early cases assuming that where a private relator prosecutes the writ he
must show a valid claim of his own to the office, see Barnum v. Gilman, (1881)
27 Minn. 466, 467, 8 N. W. 375, 376; Taylor v. Sullivan, (1891) 45 Minn.
309, 310, 47 N. W. 802, it is now recognized that the court "has the right, and
that under some circumstances it may, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, become its duty, to permit an information in the nature of quo
warranto to be filed by a private person (having no personal interest in the
question distinct from the public) to test the right of an incumbent of public
office to hold the same, notvithstanding the attorney general has refused to
give his consent to such filing." State ex rel. Dowdall v. Dahl, (1897) 69
Minn. 108, 113, 71 N. W.. 910, 911; see also State ex rel. Town of Stuntz v.
City of Chisholm, (Minn. 1936) 264 N. W. 798; 266 N. W. 689. Misconduct
on the part of an otherwise rightful claimant of the office, or acquiescence by
him in the respondent's usurpation, is no defense to ouster of the respondent
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urged that the writ of ouster in quo warranto is not strictly an
original exercise of the power of removal from public office, if
by that is meant the termination by the removal order of an until
then de jure incumbency ;33 for the grounds of quo warranto are
only those operating of their own weight to vacate the office by
rendering the respondent's incumbency illegal.3 4 The writ is more
in the nature of a proceeding to oust persons who are not officers
than one to remove officers. And in some cases the prior vacating
cause has been the valid exercise of a removal power of an officer
or tribunal other than the court ;3" or the decision of a competent
disputed elections tribunal;" or a "conviction of any infamous
crime, or of any offense involving a violation of his [the officer's]
official oath.""7 In all such cases the jurisdiction of a court in
where the attorney general prosecutes the writ. State ex rel. Probstfield v.
Sharp,
33 (1880) 27 Minn. 38, 39, 6 N. W. 408.
Where a home rule charter provides that removals within the classified civil service shall only be by the civil service commission for cause, the
mere existence of incompetency as a sufficient cause, or the commencement
of removal proceedings, or an invalid removal order, do not vacate the office
and disentitle the holder to the salary thereof; nor does a subsequent valid
removal order relate back. Markus v. City of Duluth, (1917) 138 Minn. 225,
164 3N.
4 W. 906.
1n a quo warranto proceeding to oust a county superintendent, it was
held that the court could not consider an alleged neglect of duties, but only
whether the respondent had vacated his office by removing his residence from
the county. State ex rel. Young v. Hays, (1908) 105 Minn. 399, 400, 117 N. W.
615 (issue of removal of residence determined in respondent's favor).
352 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 6953 (3). See State ex rel. Douglas
v. Megaarden, (1901) 85 Minn. 41, 88 N. W. 412; State ex rel. Hilton v.
Essling, (1923) 157 Minn. 15, 195 N. W. 539.
3862 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 6953 (7). See Note, Contested Elections-Delegation of Judicial Power to a Non-Judicial Body, (1931) 15 MINNEso'rA LAw REVIEw 822. Quo warranto will not lie to determine an election
contest where the law specifically provides another remedy, see State cx rel.
Bell v. Moriarty, (1900) 82 Minn. 68-69, 84 N. W. 495, 496; although it
never has been settled in this state whether quo warranto is excluded as a
concurrent remedy where a municipal legislative body is given power to determine the elections and qualifications of its own members. See State ex
rel. Simpson v. Dowlan, (1885) 33 Minn. 536, 24 N. W. 188, where the court
avoided determining this question by holding there was not a sufficient
public interest to justify the writ at the suit of a private relator. See Throop,
Public Officers 388-389. Quo warranto is unavailable to oust the presiding
officer of a city council on the ground that another had been invalidly removed by the council from that office, see State ex rel. Childs v. Kiichli,
(1893) 53 Minn. 147, 153-154, 54 N. W. 1069, 1070: ". . . it would require
a clear and explicit expression of legislative intention . . .to justify the conclusion that it was the design to deprive this city council of the universally
recognized parliamentary right of control over their own presiding officer."
372 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 6953(5).
The court and jury in the
criminal proceeding by convicting the defendant are exercising original jurisdiction to remove from public office; and if supplemental aid by quo warranto
is ever necessary to oust the one convicted from possession, the court has to
determine only the easily proved fact of the prior conviction, and the more
difficult legal question whether it was for the type of crime that disqualifies

under the statute.
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quo warranto, if required to effect an ouster from possession, is
more by way of review, supplemental, or ancillary, than original.
But in other cases the existence of a prior vacating cause presents
an original issue of fact or law, or both; the court is the first
tribunal of any sort to hear the evidence and determine its preponderance;38 its writ of ouster is the first determination that the
prior incumbency has been in fact illegal; and in the meantime the
incumbent will usually have been the de facto officer whose acts
as regards the public are entirely valid." It is thought proper to
consider such cases as instances of a direct and original removal
power of courts over public officers. Depending on whether or not
there is also a general removal power over the officer in question
residing elsewhere, the removal power of the courts on grounds
for which quo warranto lies may be either concurrent or exclusive.
Thus a court may oust an officer whose office exists only by
virtue of an unconstitutional statute ;10 one whose appointment is
invalid because of the unconstitutionality of the statute vesting
the appointing power, 4 1 or because the controlling statute does not
vest the appointing power in the one who has purported to exercise
it ;42 one whom a board of county commissioners has improperly
reappointed ad interim to the office of county treasurer from which
he had been validly suspended by the governor ;3 a former member
of the legislature from the office of boiler inspector to which he
had been appointed in violation of article 4, section 9 of the state
onstitution," interpreted by the court to apply to his appointment
38
Though compare State ex rel. Douglas v. Gylstrom, (1899) 77 Minn.
355, 79 N. W. 1038, discussed in the text.
39
See State ex rel. Bales v. Bailey, (1908) 106 Minn. 138, 141, 118 N. W.

676, 678; State ex rel. Egan v. Schram, (1901) 82 Minn. 420, 422-423, 85
N. W. 155, 156; Carli v. Rhener, (1880) 27 Minn. 292, 293, 7 N. W. 139;
State v. Brown, (1867) 12 Minn. 538 (Gil. 448, 457). "But this principle
does not apply when the officer himself claims the benefit of his acts." State
ex rel. Egan v. Schram, (1901) 82 Minn. 420, 423, of 85 N. NV. 156; and see
Larsen v. City of St. Paul, (1901) 83 Mfii. 473, 475, 86 N. W. 459; O'Brien
v. City of St. Paul, (1898) 72 Minn. 256, 75 N. W. 375; Yorks v. City of St.
Paul, (1895) 62 Minn. 250, 64 N. W. 565; Stoner. Recovery of Salary by a
De Facto
Officer, (1912) 10 Mich. L. Rev. 178. 291-292.
40
See State ex rel. Benson v. Peterson, (1930) 180 Minn. 366, 230 N. W.
830. 41
State ex rel. Douglas v. Ritt, (1899) 76 Minn. 531, 79 N. W. 535.
42
State ex rel. Forrer v. McIntosh, (1909) 109 Minn. 18, 122 N. W.
462; see also State ex rel. Grode v. Johnstone, (1895) 61 Minn. 56, 63 N. W.
176; State ex rel. Childs v. Routh, (1895) 61 Minn. 205, 63 N. W. 621.
43
State ex rel. Childs v. Dart, (1894) 57 Minn. 261, 59 N. W. 190.
44
"No senator or representative shall . . . hold an office under the state
which has been created or the emoluments of which have been increased
during the session of the legislature of which he was a member, until one year
after the expiration of his term of office in the legislature."
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although made after he had resigned as legislator;"5 the holder
of two otherwise inconsistent offices from the first, it being automatically vacated by acceptance of the second ;46 one who has never
had 47 or else has ceased to have 8 the citizenship or residence qtalications of his office; and one who has failed to file a required bond
within the proper time,"9 or otherwise failed to qualify.'
In all such cases the issues of fact and law are clear and definite
of ascertainment, though not necessarily of solution; and in all
of them a court is deciding in the first instance the existence of a
legal ground for the removal of one at least factually an officer."1
Cases of somewhat more difficult import are those involving statutory qualifications of competency required as the basis of a valid
appointment. Though a court may receive evidence relating to the
existence of such qualifications, 2 there is here some danger of
infringing unduly upon the proper province of the appointing
power. This the courts have avoided by applying what is more
in the nature of a rule of review than of weighing the evidence
to ascertain its preponderance.
In State ex rel. Douglas v. Gylstromn" the proceeding was to
oust the respondent from the position of boiler inspector to which
he had been appointed by the governor. A statute provided:
"No person shall be eligible . . . who has not had at least 10

years of actual experience in operating steam engines and steam
boilers, .

.

. or who is not . . . suitably qualified by experience

in the construction of steam boilers so as to enable him to perform
the duties of the office, .
45State ex rel. Childs v. Sutton, (1895) 63 Minn. 147, 65 N. W. 2J2.
Compare State ex rel. Dowdall v. Dahl, (1897) 69 Minn. 108, 71 N. W. 910,
disallowing the writ at the suit of a private relator against a member of
the legislature to oust him from the appointive office of court stenographer.
Dissent by Buck and Canty, JJ.
46State ex rel. Hilton v. Sword, (1923) 157 Minn. 263, 264-266, 196
N. W. 467; see also Hoffman v. Downs, (1920) 145 Minn. 465, 467, 177
N. W. 669, 670.
47Taylor v. Sullivan, (1891) 45 Minn. 309, 47 N. W. 802.
48
See State ex rel. Young v. Hays, (1908) 105 Minn. 399, 117 N. W.

615.

49County of Scott v. Ring, (1882) 29 Minn. 398, 404, 13 N. W. 181.
5State ex rel. Young v. Ladeen, (1908) 104 Minn. 252, 116 N. W. 486.
5t That the holder of an office existing only under an unconstitutional
statute may yet be a de facto officer for some purposes, see Field, The Effect
of An Unconstitutional Statute 90-113.
5The court's determination must necessarily be on the basis of its own
record, since the appointing power will have preserved no formal record of
evidence relied on in making the appointment. Also the original character
of the proceeding requires that the court be allowed to take new evidence.
53(1899) 77 Minn. 355, 79 N. W. 1038.
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The court, over the dissent of Start, C. J., and Buck, J.,' quashed
the writ in quo warranto on the ground that the evidence, though
definitely preponderating against the respondent's eligibility, nevertheless reasonably supported the opposite conclusion; saying,
through Collins, J.:
cc... the state, through its attorney general, having legally
questioned respondent's eligibility to the office, the burden of
proof is upon him to establish that he is eligible.

.

. . But the

question of his eligibility is not to be determined by this court by
merely weighing the testimony, and then determining the matter
upon a preponderance of evidence, .

. for that would be an en-

.

croachment upon the functions of the governor, who has made the
appointment, and in so doing has passed upon the qualifications of
Mr. Gylstrom for the place. If there is evidence which reasonably
tends to support the conclusion reached by the executive when he
was called upon to determine this very question of eligibility under the statute, this court cannot interfere, and say that, because
the proofs preponderate against the respondent, the action of the
governor must be set aside."' 5
That a court may not pay the same deference to the appointing
power of a municipal officer or body is shown by State ex rel.
Johnson v. Starkey,' which involved an ordinance of the city of
St. Paul requiring that the inspector of public buildings be "a
practical architect and sanitary engineer." The court issued its
writ of ouster, saying through Vanderburgh, J.:
"Within the designated class, the discretion of the council in
the election of such officer cannot be reviewed; and, under any
circumstances, the case ought to be very clear to authorize a quo
warranto proceeding of this kind. .

. There must

.

.

. . be

some line of distinction between those who are entitled to be denominated 'architects' and those who are not, and the latter are
not eligible; and, if the person elected is claimed to be ineligible,
the fact may be made the subject of judicial inquiry. The term
'architect' has a well-defined meaning. Whether a person is or
is not 'a practical architect and sanitary engineer' is a matter
susceptible of proof, and in this case must be determined upon the
evidence as disclosed by the record.

.

.

. While the respondent

has had some experience in building for himself and others, and
also in the construction of sewers, he admits that he had never
practiced or followed the profession or business of an architect,
and it is quite clear that he is not sufficiently skilled in the princip54At 77 Minn., 358-360, 79 N. W. 1040, based on an interpretation of
the qualifications required by the statute as cumulative rather than alternative, and that "the evidence is conclusive that he [the respondent] never
had 10 years', or any less numbers of years', actual experience in operating
steam engines and boilers."
55At 77 Minn. 356, 79 N. W. 1039.
58(1892) 49 Minn. 503, 52 N. W. 24.
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ples of architecture and sanitary plumbing, or in the application
of the same in practice, to render him eligible to the office of building inspector under the ordinance. The city council has therefore
failed to make a valid appointment. .

..

"I'

But the incompetency, to be the basis of a proceeding in quo
warranto, must consist in a lack of the statutory qualifications required for a valid appointment, as distinguished from incompetency
or neglect subsequently developing in the performance of his duties
by an officer validly appointed. Incompetency of the latter sort
does not of its own weight vacate the office or render the officer's
incumbency illegal

;58

and the termination of his otherwise de jure

character requires the exercise of an original removal power residing elsewhere than in the courts. 9 It is with their relation by
way of review to removals of the latter sort that this study is
chiefly concerned." °
I.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REMOVALS

Article 13, section 1 of the Minnesota constitution provides for
the removal of the "governor, secretary of state, treasurer, auditor, attorney general and judges of the supreme and district courts"
by the cumbersome and essentially political process of impeachment. 1 The grounds thereof are "corrupt conduct in office" and
57At
58

49 Minn. 508, 52 N. W. 26.

Markus v. City of Duluth, (1917) 138 Minn. 225, 229, 164 N. W.
906, 908.
59
State ex rel. Young v. Hays, (1908) 105 Minn. 399, 400, 117 N. W.
615. 6
; t has usually been assumed that the equitable remedy by injunction can
never duplicate the function of quo warranto in trying title to public office.
The reasons given are: (1) adequacy of the remedy at law, see Burke v.
Leland, (1892) 51 Minn. 355, 357, 53 N. W. 716, 717; (2) equity's unwillingness to interfere in political matters; and (3) the earlier conception that
equity protects only property rights in the technical sense. See Note, (1932)
6 Temple L. Q. 558. But in a code jurisdiction there is no sufficient reason
why equity, having jurisdiction to protect the possession of a de facto officer,
may not go ahead and finally determine title to the office, see School Dist.
No. 47 v. Weise, (1899) 77 Minn. 167, 170-171, 79 N. W. 668, 669 (concurring
opinion by Canty, J.) ; Heyward v. Long, (S.C. 1935) 183 S. E. 145, noted
20 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw June, 1936. There is thus the possibility of a
suit by a claimant in possession to enjoin a disturbance of his possession.
proving a boomerang by requiring him to prove his own title, and opening
the way for his own final ouster in the same proceeding. For the extent to
which equitable jurisdiction may be conferred by a provision of a home rule
charter, see Oehler v. City of St. Paul, (1928) 174 Minn. 410, 219 N. W.
760. But equitable jurisdiction is generally unavailable where the original
plaintiff is not himself the one in possession of the office, see Jensen v. Indep.
Consol. School Dist. No. 85, (1924) 160 Minn. 233, 199 N. W. 911.
GlThere is perhaps no better example of the defects of the impeachment
process than that provided by the impeachment of Governor Cox of Minnesota in 1881. See Pound, Outlines of Jurisprudence, 4th ed., 57, pointing out
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"crimes and misdemeanors." As to the officers enumerated, impeachment is no doubt the exclusive method of removal, except
to the extent that a disputed election contest or a quo warranto proceeding are available on grounds going to the validity of their
election or the legality otherwise of their incumbency. 2 So also
the grounds enumerated were no doubt intended to be the exclusive grounds of removal by impeachment; but even assuming a
conviction by the senate 3 on evidence palpably insufficient to sustain the existence of either of the enumerated grounds, the inability of the courts to afford relief results not so much from
deference to the co-ordinate legislative department as from the
fact that for the trial of impeachment charges the senate is itself
a "court" in the constitutional sense inferior to no other."' It has
the same power to err, limited only by its own self-restraint, that
necessarily inheres in any court of last resort. 3
Section 2 of the same article of the constitution authorizes the
legislature "to provide for the removal of inferior 0 officers .. .
for malfeasance or nonfeasance in the performance of their duties."
In so far as this section may be interpreted as limiting the grounds
of removal of inferior officers to those embraced within "inalfeasance or nonfeasance" in office, " , it is more of a restriction than
the extent to which senators participated in the arguments without having
heard the evidence, and voted without having heard either the evidence or the
arguments.
62See State ex rel. Sothre v. Moodie, (1935) 65 N. D. 340, 258 N. W. 558,
permitting quo warranto against the governor-elect of North Dakota on the
ground that he lacked the residence qualifications of his office.
03The method of impeachment, i. e., by charges brought by the house of
representatives before the bar of the senate, is provided in art. 4, sec. 14 of
the constitution. Compare the method in Nebraska, where the trial is before
the supreme court of the state. Neb. constitution, art. 3, sec. 14.
04For a discussion of the judicial nature of the senate's function in inpeachment proceedings, see Van Hecke, Pardons in Impeachment Ca es,
(1924) 24 Mich. L. Rev. 657, 670-673.
"Compare Stone, J., dissenting in United States v. Butler, (1936) 56 Sup.
Ct. 312, 325:

".

.

. the only check upon our owtn exercise of power is our

own sense of self-restraint."
O6Such officers presumably include all falling within the category of
officers as distinguished from employees, municipal as well as state, excepting
members of the legislature and those expressly enumerated in section 1 of
article 13. See Sykes v. City of Minneapolis, (1913) 124 .Minn. 73. 77, 144
N. W. 453, 455. A probate judge has been held to be an "inferior" officer
within the constitutional provision. Martin v. County of Dodge, (1920) 146
Minn. 129, 131, 178 N. W. 167, 168.
0
rSee Sykes v. City of Minneapolis, (1913) 124 Minn. 73, 77. 144 N. W.
453, 455. But compare State ex rel. Townsend v. Ward, (1897) 70 Minn.
58, 72 N. W. 825, involving a legislative charter provision authorizing a
municipal council to remove an elective mayor "for cause," embracing somewhat wider grounds than "malfeasance or nonfeasance" in office. No constitutional issue was raised, and the decision was only to the effect that the
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a grant of legislative power. But it has never been so interpreted
as to appointive officers; and in Minnesota the law is clear that
in the absence of legislative restrictions the power to remove appointive officers will be held to be at the pleasure of the appointing
power. 68 As a grant of legislative power the constitutional provision has the decided merit of precluding, on the one hand, any
doubt of legislative competence to provide for statewide supervision
of local officers, elective as well as appointive, and of precluding
on the other hand a decision in Minnesota such as Myers v. United
States,69 to the extent that that case holds a blanket grant of the
constitutional executive power to carry with it an absolute re70
moval power incapable of legislative curtailment.
writ of prohibition was not the proper remedy.

See also Townsend v.

Common Council of Sauk Center, (1898) 71 Minn. 379, 74 N. W. 150, where
on certiorari to review the same removal proceeding the decision was on other

grounds in favor of the relator, the only party to raise a constitutional issue.
68
See Parish v. City of St. Paul, (1901)

84 Minn. 426, 429, 87 N. W.

1124, 1125: "... where no tenure of office is fixed by law, and no provision
is made for the removal of the incumbent, the power of removal

is a

necessary incident to the power of appointment ;" Egan v. City of St. Paul,

(1894) 57 Minn. 1, 5, 58 N. W. 267, 268-269: ". . . where the tenure of an
appointive office is not prescribed by the constitution or by statute, the appointee holds at the will of the appointing power and of himself, and he
may be removed by the former at pleasure." In Sykes v. City of Minneapolis,
(1913) 124 Minn. 73, 144 N. W. 453, the same rule was applied though the
term of the appointive officer was fixed by charter at two years, and the
removal was before the expiration of that term. But compare State ex rel.
Village of Chisholm v. Bergeron, (1923) 156 Minn. 276, 194 N. W. 624,
where the court implied limitations on the removal power from other provisions of the controlling statute.
69(1926) 272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21, 71 L. Ed. 160, holding that the
president's power to remove a first class postmaster appointed by himself with
the consent of the Senate is derived from the constitution, and therefore
exclusive and incapable of congressional curtailment. In Rathbun v. United
States, (1935) 295 U. S. 602, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 79 L. Ed. 1710, the Myers decision was limited so as not to prevent congressional restriction of the
president's power to remove a federal trade commissioner, on the theory
that such an officer is of a quasi-judicial character outside the regular executive organization. Nor did the Myers decision determine that Congress may
not limit the president's removal power over "inferior" federal officers so
described by Congress, by vesting their appointment in the president alone,
or in the heads of departments. See the thoroughgoing analysis in Corwin,
Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, (1927)
27 Col. L. Rev. 353.
70That the Myers case can have no significance in Minnesota, see State
ex rel. Clapp v. Peterson, (1892) 50 Minn. 239, 244, 52 N. W. 655: "The
power thus conferred [by the constitution upon the legislature] is plenary,
and confers authority upon the legislature to vest the power of removal, and
the determination of the question whether cause for removal exists, in any
department of the government, or in any officer or official body, it may deem
expedient;" In re Application for Removal of Nash, (1920) 147 Minn.
383, 385, 181 N. W. 570, 571: "The courts can in no way interfere with the
exercise of the powers which the constitution vests in the governor, but the
power of amotion from office is not given him by the constitution, but rests
only on an act of the legislature, ..."
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The present study is not concerned with the legislative allocation of the removal power over the various categories of officers
and employees, or with the removal power at all wherever it has
been expressly made or impliedly left unrestricted; but only with
the extent to which restrictions that have been imposed permit
of some protection by the courts of the rights in public office or
employment thereby recognized. So limited the subject-matter
conveniently falls into five subdivisions: (A) restrictions on the
governor's removal power; (B) veterans' preference; (C) firemen's and policemen's civil service tenure; (D) teachers' tenure;
and (E) miscellaneous tenure provisions of special legislative and
home rule charters or ordinances enacted thereunder. Cross-reference will frequently be made to cases apposite to the immediate
discussion though logically falling in a later subdivision; and to
avoid repetition, the discussion in each succeeding subdivision will
be curtailed by reference to preceding ones.
A. Restrictions on the Governor's Removal Power.-As to his
own appointees within the state executive or administrative services the governor's removal power is at present generally unlimited. 71 As to other state executive or administrative officers and
employees who do not come under veterans' preference, the removal power is generally at the pleasure of an appointing officer
responsible in turn to the governor.72 The legislature has further
empowered the governor to remove from office
"any clerk of the supreme or a district court, judge of probate,
judge of any municipal court, justice of the peace, court
commissioner, sheriff, coroner, auditor, register of deeds, county
attorney, county superintendent of schools, county commissioner,
county treasurer, or any collector, receiver, or custodian of public
moneys, whenevaer it appears to him, by competent evidence, that
either has been guilty of malfeasance or nonfeasance in the performance of his official duties; first giving to such officer a copy
of the charges against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his
defense."7 3
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 53 (5), 58.
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 53 (48). This is not true of the indcpendent elective heads who share the constitutional executive power with
the governor. Minn. constitution, Art. 5, sec. 1.
732 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 6954 (Italics supplied). There follow
provisions for the appointment by the governor of a special commissioner to
take and report testimony, to which it is required that the witnesses subscribe
(sec. 6955); and provisions specially applicable to the suspension and removal of county treasurers (secs. 6959-6961). The governor may himself
instigate removal proceedings under the statute, or act upon the petition of
an interested party; however, in the latter event, the interested party has
no way of compelling him to act upon the petition. State ex rel. Birkeland
v. Christianson, (1930) 179 Minn. 337, 229 N. W. 313.
711
721
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The officers enumerated no doubt do not exhaust the constitutional
power of the legislature to center in the governor, through the
removal power, a statewide supervision of "inferior" officers, elective as well as appointive and local as well as state.7 4 As to the
officers enumerated the governor's power of removal is exclusive,
except as regards those grounds already considered that may render
their appointment or election invalid or their incumbency otherwise illegal.7 5 Although as regards a county treasurer the power
to suspend pending a removal proceeding is specifically conferred,70
the removal power alone as to the other enumerated officers has
been held to include a summary power to suspend pending and
before hearing 7 7 An officer validly suspended or removed has
been held ineligible for reappointment to the same office while the
suspension order lasts or during the remainder of the term from
which he has been removed."8
74

The decision in State ex rel. Hilton v. Essling, (1923) 157 Minn. 15, 195
N. W. 539, holding the words of the statute "any collector, receiver, or
custodian of public moneys" inapplicable to a custodian solely of municipal
funds, was reached by statutory interpretation and in no way limits tile
constitutional grant of legislative power contained in section 2 of article 13.
The history of the statute all the way down from territorial days is traced
by the court at 157 Minn. 16-20, 195 N. W. 539-541. Judges of municipal
courts and justices of the peace are considered state officers, see State ex
rel. Simpson v. Fleming, (1910) 112 Minn. 136, 127 N. W. 473; State ex rel.
Rosckes v. Dreger, (1906) 97 Minn. 221, 225, 106 N. W. 904. So also is
a mayor, in connection with the enforcement of the state liquor laws, see
State ex rel. Young v. Robinson, (1907) 101 Minn. 277, 283, 112 N. W.
269, 7270.
5

See State ex rel. Young v. Hayes, (1908) 105 Minn. 399, 400, 117
N. W. 615; State ex rel. Martin v. Burnquist, (1918) 141 Minn. 308, 321.
170 N. W. 201, 203.
762 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 6959. In State ex rel. Clapp v. Peterson, (1892) 50 Minn. 239, 245, 52 N. W. 655, the court pointed out in answer
to the contention that the power under the section to suspend a treasurer
without hearing was in excess of the constitutional grant: "Such temporary
suspension without previous hearing is fully in accordance with the analogies
of the law. It is a constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of
his liberty except by due process of law, which includes notice and a hearing,
yet it was never claimed that in criminal proceedings a person could not he
arrested and deprived of his liberty until a trial could reasonably be had, and
the rights of the parties determined."
7
7State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden, (1901) 85 Minn. 41, 47, 88 N. W.
412, 414-415 (sheriff) : Martin v. County of Dodge, (1920) 146 Minn. 129,
131-132, 178 N. W. 167, 168 (judge of probate). In the Martin Case the
suspension order was followed by the appointment of a successor, and after
the hearing by a removal order which was quashed on certiorari, see State
ex rel. Martin v. Burnquist, (1918) 141 Minn. 308, 170 N. W. 201. It was held
in the subsequent suit by the wrongfully removed officer for his salary that
the suspension was nevertheless valid, and effective to deprive him of the
salary for the time that the successor had served prior to the effective (late
of his own reinstatement.
7
8State ex rel. Childs v. Dart, (1894) 57 Minn. 261, 263, 59 N. W. 190:
"Such removal proceedings are not merely for the purpose of ousting the
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No appeal to the courts from the governor's action being spedfically provided, their relation thereto must depend, first, upon
the extent to which they may direct their extraordinary remedies
to so high an officer as the chief executive of the state, and second,
upon the nature and scope of such remedies. After some fluctuation in the earlier decisions in this state,7 9 it seems now to be
settled that as to high officers as well as low the main question
in every case is the nature of the act or duty sought to be compelled, restrained, or reviewed, rather than one of mere courtesy
to a co-ordinate department, or fear of intergovernmental friction
or of inability to enforce the court's decree.8 0 Whether to proceed at all in exercise of his removal power is clearly a matter
committed by the statute to the governor's executive discretion, and
it is settled that a court may not by mandamus compel him to do
so."' May they compel him to refrain or desist from proceeding
against an officer not one of those enumerated, and therefore not
legally within his removal power under the statute?
In State ex rel. Hilton v. Essling, 2 the attorney general sought
in quo warranto to oust from possession of his office the mayor
of Eveleth, who had already been suspended by the governor in a
proceeding for his removal for malfeasance in office. The court
quashed the' writ on the ground that although the mayor was a
custodian of public moneys, the words of the statute "any collector, receiver, or custodian of public moneys" read in the light of
the statute's history could not have been intended to include a custodian solely of municipal funds. The court thus collaterally determined the governor's lack of jurisdiction in the removal proceeding. Under a similar state of facts the writ of prohibition
has been directed by the supreme court to a municipal body attempting to exercise a removal power wholly unauthorized as to
person holding the office; they include a charge that he has forfeited his
qualification for the office for the remainder of the term .... Whether the
voters at the polls could condone the offense by which he forfeited his office
it is not necessary here to decide. We are of the opinion that the county commissioners could not do so." See Finkelstein, Removal and Re-Election of
Public Officers, (1932) 7 St. John's L. Rev. 42.
79
See Kumm, Mandamus to the Governor in Minnesota, (1924) 9 MIN.NESOTA LAw REVIEW 21; Notes, (1930)
14 MiNN soTA LAw REviw 303,
572.
iOSee Cooke v. Iverson, (1909), 108 Minn. 388, 393, 122 N. W. 251;
State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, (1911) 116 Minn. 313, 314-320, 133 N. W.
857-860;
and references cited in footnote 79.
8
'State ex rel. Birkeland v. Christianson, (1930) 179 Minn. 337, 229
N. W. 313.
s2(1923) 157 Minln. 15, 195 N. W. 539.
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the officer involved, 3 and the governor of the state has no greater
discretion to proceed in a matter wholly beyond his jurisdiction.
It is prerequisite to the writ of prohibition, as to the writ of certiorari, that the officer or tribunal against whom it is directed be
acting or proceeding to act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. 4
The term "judicial," in reference to permissive administrative
action that nevertheless closely resembles the ordinary action of
courts in both its method and effect on individual and property
rights, is usually "softened by a quasi" 5 by way of tribute to the
principle of the separation of powers in the very process of disregarding for practical reasons its full implications. The same
matter may be non-judicial in the sense of permitting it to be
confided to an officer or tribunal outside the regular judicial hierarchy, and at the same time judicial in the sense of permitting
court review thereof by certiorari. The two problems involve
entirely different considerations and approaches.8 0
The power of removal from public office, wherever it requires
specific grounds or "cause," especially if coupled with requirements
of notice and hearing, as in the instant statute, is "judicial" in
As soon as the governor has decided upon
the second sense."
action rather than non-action in the exercise of his removal power
83State ex rel. Brandt v. Thompson, (1904) 91 Minn. 279, 97 N. W.
887. The lack of jurisdiction must be complete, see State ex rel. Townsend
v. Ward, (1897) 70 Minn. 58, 63-64, 72 N. W. 825-826: "The charge and
specifications may be vague, indefinite, and insufficient, but this does not
affect the jurisdiction of the tribunal in question. If the specific acts charged
are not such as, if proved, would sustain the action, no jurisdictional question
is raised;" State ex rel. Jarvis v. Craig, (1907) 100 Minn. 352, 355, 111 N. W.
3, 5; Prignitz v. Fischer, (1860) 4 Minn. 366 (Gil. 275, 276). But the lack
of jurisdiction is complete when the removal power does not include the
particular officer over whom it is sought to be exercised. State ex rel. Brandt
v. Thompson,
(1904) 91 Minn. 279, 97 N. W. 887.
84
State ex rel. Hahn v. Young, (1881) 29 Minn. 474, 523, 9 N. W. 737,
738. The writ may issue only from the supreme court, see 2 Mason's 1927
Minn. Stat., sec. 9734.
SHolmes, J., dissenting in Springer v. Government of the Philippine
Islands, (1928) 277 U. S.189, 210, 48 Sup. Ct. 480, 485, 72 L. Ed. 845.
86As a term differentiating the administrative from the judicial process,
in order to sustain administrative action within the separation of powers
principle, the word "quasi" is meaningless. See Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, (1935) 19 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 261,
265-275. As a term expressing sufficient similarity to permit of court review,
it is useful.
87
Dullam v. Wilson, (1884) 53 Mich. 392, 19 N. W. 112; State dx rel.
Hart v. Common Council of Duluth, (1893) 53 Minn. 238, 242-243, 55 N. W.
118, 119-120; State ex rel. Fuslong v. McColl, (1914) 127 Minn. 155, 160,
149 N. W. 11, 13; see also Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson, (1903) 91 Mi.
30, 33, 97 N. W. 454, 455; "The character of the office or tribunal does
not determine the question, but, rather, the nature of the act performed;"
(1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 1252.
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under the statute, his discretion has ceased to be wholly an executive one and become a legal one controllable by legal processes.
It is settled that certiorari is available to review his action taken
in reference to an officer within the enumerated group."' But in
Minnesota certiorari is not the proper remedy in the event of a
total absence of jurisdiction.89 Since in the certiorari cases the
court has so easily overcome both the obstacle of directing an
extraordinary remedy to the chief executive and the requirement
that he be acting in a judicial capacity, the writ of prohibition
should be available in the event of his proceeding against an officer wholly beyond his jurisdiction. The mayor of Eveleth in the
above case might himself have taken the initiative to compel discontinuance of the proceeding against him.
In re Application for Removal of Nash9" was a proceeding by
88
State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, (1911) 116 Minn. 313, 314-320, 133
N. W. 857-860. On the history, prerequisites, scope and procedure of review
by certiorari in this state, see also City of St. Paul v. Marvin, (1870) 16 Minn.
102 (Gil. 91); In re Wilson, (1884) 32 Minn. 145, 19 N. W. 723; State
ex rel. Hardy v. Clough, (1896) 64 Minn. 378, 67 N. W. 202; State ex rel.
Narveson v. Village of McIntosh, (1905) 95 Minn. 243, 103 N. W. 1017;
Bilsborrow v. Pierce, (1907) 101 Minn. 271, 112 N. W. 274; State ex rel.
Ross v. Posz, (1908) 106 Minn. 197, 118 N. W. 1014; State ex rel. Brown v.
Board of Public Works of Red Wing, (1916) 134 Minn. 204, 158 N. W. 977.
No new evidence is introduced, and the court acts only on the petition and
the return by the officer or tribunal to whom the writ is directed. The return,
"in so far as it is responsive to the writ, is conclusive and imports absolute
verity," and should include all "proceedings in the nature of a record, and
rulings of the inferior tribunal, and the evidence." "It is in the power of the
court to require a further return, if it is apparent that the commands of the
writ have not been fully complied with." State ex rel. Sholund v. Duluth,
(1914) 125 Minn. 425, 427-428, 147 N. W. 820-821; see also State ex rel.
Holland v. Sudheimer, (1925) 164 Minn. 437, 439, 205 N. W. 369, 370. The
writ must be directed to the officer or tribunal in his or its official capacity,
else it will be regarded as only a subpoena duces tecum. State ex rel. Berg v.
Village Council of Blackduck, (1909) 107 Minn. 441, 120 N. W. 894. The
writ may issue either directly from the supreme court, see 1 Mason's 1927
Minn. Stat., sec. 132, or from a district court, see 1 Mason's 1927 Minn.
Stat., sec. 156; but where the proceeding is originally in the supreme court the
practice is "to remit the parties to a proper district court except in cases where
general public interest requires immediate determination." See State ex rel.
Grubbs v. Schulz, (1919) 142 Minn. 112, 113, 171 N. W. 263, 264. In cases
involving the governor's removal power a sufficient public interest to admit
of an original proceeding in the supreme court has been assumed without
discussion.
89
State ex rel. Mansfield v. Mayor of St. Paul, (1885) 34 Minn. 250,
25 N. W. 449. This decision, involving an altogether nonexistent power in
the person who purported to exercise it, should not preclude a court on review
by certiorari of a removal proceeding already had, from considering whether
or not the officer was within the enumerated class under the statute. See
State ex rel. Martin v. Burnquist, (1918) 141 Minn. 308, 319, 170 N. W. 201,
202.
90(1920) 147 Minn. 383, 181 N. W. 570.
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certiorari to review the removal by the governor of Nash as county
attorney of Hennepin county.
"The governor found three charges true, namely: That the
relator was a party to the so-called liquor conspiracy; that lie had
received a bribe in the Max Brooks Case; and that he had received
a bribe in the cases of four women indicted for keeping houses of
ill-fame. Any one of these findings, if sustained by the evidence,
furnished a sufficient ground for the order of amotion."''
Implicit in this statement are two rules as to the scope of review
by certiorari available to an officer within the enumerated group:
(1) that the court will determine as a question of law whether
the grounds relied on constitute "malfeasance or nonfeasance" in
office; and (2) that the court will review the evidence to ascertain
"whether it furnished any reasonable or substantial basis" for
the existence in fact of the grounds relied on, although not to the
extent of substituting the court's own judgment for that of the
governor as to the preponderance of the evidence or the credibility
of witnesses. 92
Though the court has said that "Malfeasance in office . . .
has a well defined and a well understood meaning," 3 a conclusion
somewhat opposed to the experience with the term and the trinity
to which it belongs in the law of torts, it has also said more
realistically in State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, 4 that the "terms
'malfeasance' and 'nonfeasance' have no technical meaning in the
sense in which they are employed" in the statute. Though in the
same case the court said that "general incompetency and neglect
of duty" are sufficient, it suggested that as to a county attorney,
ignorance of the law is his constitutional privilege and of itself
no ground for his removal. His removal was sustained for the
reason that the charges and the evidence showed "that he wholly
failed to comprehend the duties required of him in the prosecution
of liquor cases, and that he neglected and refused to take the
proper steps to see that the laws were properly enforced" after demand was made upon him.
All the cases other than the only one wherein the governor's
action was not sustained have involved matters of a somewhat more
serious import than mere incompetency or neglect. and rather in
the nature of intentional wrongdoing or corrupt conduct. "ConD'At 147 Minn. 387, 181 N. W. 572.
92
At 147 Minn. 388, 181 N. W. 572.
93
State ex rel. Martin v. Burnquist, (1918) 141 Minn. 308, 321, 170
N. W. 201, 203.
04(1911)
116 Minn. 313, 321, 133 N. W. 857, 861.
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nor is it a sufficient defense

that the accused officer has already been acquitted in a previous
criminal prosecution of the same charge oil which the removal
proceeding is basedG On the other hand the mere fact that indictments have been returned against the officer is not of itself a
legally sufficient ground of his removal ;" nor does the fact that
the charge against him embraces conduct of a criminal character
render it for that reason alone sufficient. In State ex rel. Martin
v. Burnquist,91 the only case on review by certiorari wherein the
court has failed to sustain the governor's action, the relator had
been removed as probate judge of Dodge county on account of
disloyal and seditious language uttered in war time. In quashing
the governor's removal order the court, through Brown, C. J.,
stated the following criteria:
"The misconduct or misfeasance under our law must have
direct relation and be connected with the 'performance of official
duties,' and amount either to maladministration, or to wilful and
intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office
at all. This does not include acts and conduct, though amounting
to a violation of the criminal laws of the state, which have no
connection with the discharge of official duties,...

as to an officer

who is charged with the duty of enforcing and maintaining law
and order, it is probable that conduct similar to that charged
against relator would constitute misconduct in the performance of
official duties, and be ground for removal under the statute. But
we are clear that scolding the president of the United States,
particularly at long range, condemning in a strong voice the war
policy of the federal authorities, expressing sympathy with Germany, justifying the sinking of the Lusitania, by remarks made
by a public officer of the jurisdiction and limited authority possessed
by the judge of probate under the constitution and laws of this
state, do not constitute malfeasance in the discharge of official
duties and therefore furnish no legal ground for removal."90
95
State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, (1911) 116 Minn. 313, 321, 133
N. W. 857, 861.
961n re Application for Removal of Nash, (1920) 147 Minn. 383, 387, 391,
181 N. W. 570, 572, 573-574. The prior acquittal had been in a federal court,
but the same conclusion would have been reached had it been in a state court
in a prosecution under state law. "The offenses are not the same, even if
predicated on the same act, and neither proceeding can operate as a bar to
the other." The question in the removal proceeding "is whether the accused
officer has so misconducted himself in respect to the performance of his official duties that the good of, the public service requires his removal from
office." For the same reason misconduct on the part of the officer occurring in
a previous term, despite subsequent re-election, may be considered, see State
ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden, (1901) 85 Minn. 41, 43, 88 N. W. 412, 413.
97
State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, (1911) 116 Minn. 313, 321, 133
N. W. 857, 860.
98(1918) 141 Minn. 308, 170 N. W. 201.
99At 141 Minn. 322, 170 N. W. 203. In quo warranto proceeding to oust
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With reservations owing to the extreme character of the
relator's language and the prejudice with which as a result his
mind might have been affected if called upon to administer possible
war time measures concerning the devolution of property to alien
enemies, the above case may be taken as a good example of a
court keeping its head in a time of general hysteria, and perhaps
as instancing "the difference in security of judicial over administrative process." 00 The Minnesota court has not yet had to deal
with intoxication or personal immorality as grounds of removal.
By a separate statutory provision "habitual" drunkenness is
specifically made a ground for the removal of any officer "by the
authority and in the manner provided by law."''1 1 To the extent that
as to elective officers the legislative power to provide for removal
may be deemed limited to "malfeasance or nonfeasance" within the
meaning of the constitutional grant, 102 drunkenness, even though
habitual, if not directly connected with the performance of official duties or impairing the officer's capacity to perform the
same, may conceivably be a constitutionally insufficient ground of
removal. It was so held in the case of a similar constitutional
provision and statute of Kentucky. 05 Concerning adultery, somewhat more remote from the performance of official duties than
intoxication, the South Carolina court has said:
". .. the misconduct of an officer may be of such nature as
to make his continuance in office a reproach to decent government,
while his conduct might
not necessarily affect the proper admin0 4
istration of his office.'1
the removed officer from possession the scope of court review is not as broad
as on direct review by certiorari, see State ex rel. Childs v. Dart, (1894)
57 Minn. 261, 263-264, 59 N. W. 190-191: "... as long as he [the governor]
kept within his jurisdiction, we cannot in this proceeding review the questions
of fact tried by him, or determine how much or how little moral turpitude

there was in these irregularities." The only charge against the county
treasurer in the proceeding before the governor was that he held cheeks for
a two months period before presenting them for payment. It would seem
clear that such a ground of mere neglect resulting in no loss to the country
would00not now be sufficient to sustain a removal on review by certiorari.
Brandeis, J., in Ng Fung Ho v. White, (1922) 259 U. S.276, 285,
42 Sup. Ct. 492, 495, 66 L. Ed. 938; see also Hughes, C. J., in Crowell v.
Benson, (1932) 285 U. S.22, 61, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 296, 76 L. Ed. 598.
1012 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 6958.
102See Sykes v. City of Minneapolis, (1913) 12.4 Minn. 73, 77, 144 N. W.
453, 455.
lo3Holliday v. Fields, (1925) 210 Ky. 179, 275 S.W. 642. The sheriff's
drunkenness held insufficient to constitute malfeasance in office was rather
closely connected with the performance of official duties, in that it im-

mediately followed his action in closing a poolroom. See Turck, The Governor's Power to Remove County Officials, (1926) 14 Ky. L. J. 330, 336,
for a 0 4criticism of the case.
1 State ex rel. Wolfe v. Sanders, (1920) 118 S. C. 498, 509, 110 S. E.
808, 812. The governor's removal power was "for cause," of somewhat
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Looking to the procedural prerequisites as a third aspect of
court review, the charges are required to be reasonably specific,20
although the certainty required of an indictment is not necessary.
"It is sufficient if the charges are stated with substantial certainty,
and apprise the officer of the grounds upon which the charges are
based." -06 Furthermore, the hearing need not be limited by the
original charges. Further charges by way of amendment may
be considered, provided the accused officer "be given a proper
opportunity to meet the additional charges after they have been
furnished to him." 07 Likewise instances of misconduct not specified in the charges may be shown at the hearing provided the accused officer is given "ample opportunity to place before the
governor all the facts which might tend to explain his conduct." 0 8
The question in all cases is not one of technical pleading, but of
substantial fairness in the hearing accorded; and it may be assumed
that the cburt would refuse to sustain the governor's action if
taken without charges, or on indefinite and evasive charges, or
without giving the accused officer adequate opportunity to present
his own evidence or cross examine and reply to evidence against
him. Compliance by the governor with the "ordinary decencies"
of a judicial hearing is fairly assured.
broader implication than "malfeasance or nonfeasance" in office. But the
court found some connection with the performance of official duties by
emphasizing that "The defendant was the highest peace officer of the county,
and when he deliberately violated the sanctity of the home of another, and
put himself in a position in which he must have known that, if discovered
by the outraged husband, a serious breach of the peace, if not a homicide,
would almost certainly result, he was guilty of conduct unbecoming a peace
officer, and that was official misconduct for which the governor rightly removed him from office." Considering the prevalence of single-ended divorces
refused recognition in other states, there may perhaps be "degrees" of
so far as its significance in this connection is concerned.
adultery
' 05Compare State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council of Duluth, (1893) 53
Minn. 238, 245-246, 55 N. W. 118, 121-122, involving removal "for cause"
under the provisions of a local charter: "Considering them [the charges]
as a whole, they show on their face that they were not formulated in a very
judicial frame of mind. They read more like a heated hostile declamation
than a calm and deliberate statement of charges with a view to a fair investigation . . . We agree . . . that 'incompetency' and 'inefficiency' in the

discharge of official duty may be good grounds for removal, and that it may
not be necessary to specify in detail particular acts or facts. But ... while
it is not required to go into details, yet the charges ought at least to adofficer in what respect he is claimed to be incompetent or inefficient."
vise the
'10 State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, (1911) 116 Minn. 313, 321, 133
N. W.
857, 860.
07
147 Minn. 383, 387, 181
1 1n re Application for Removal of Nash, (1920)
N. W. 570, 572.
08
• State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, (1911) 116 Minn. 313, 322, 133
N. W. 857, 861. Compare People ex rel. Shuster v. Humphrey, (1898) 156
N. Y. 231, 50 N. E. 860; People ex rel. McAleer v. French. (1890) 119 N. Y.
502, 23 N. E. 1061, applying a somewhat stricter rule.
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The statutory requirement that the governor act on "competent
evidence" has been construed to mean that "the governor is not
bound to enforce the technical rules of evidence, and his decision
cannot be reversed because incompetent or irrelevant evidence was
received, if it is sufficiently supported by other competent and
relevant evidence." 109 This is a rule frequently followed as to
the applicability of the technical rules of evidence in administrative
proceedings." 0 The governor may exclude evidence technically
incompetent if he so desires. It has not yet been sufficiently
recognized that administrative discretion either to apply or reject
the technical rules of evidence may easily result in a denial of the
rudiments of a fair hearing; as if the governor should admit incompetent evidence against the accused officer yet reject inconpetent though relevant and material evidence offered in his behalf.
It is suggested that in most cases the exclusion of competent
evidence offered in behalf of the accused officer, and in some cases
the rejection of concededly incompetent but nevertheless relevant
and material evidence, should provide an adequate basis for the
court to refuse to sustain the governor's action.
It may be urged as to the aspect of court review whereby the
court determines for itself the legal sufficiency of the grounds relied on to constitute "malfeasance or nonfeasance" in office, that
the language of the decided cases goes too far in restricting the
governor's removal power to instances of intentional wrongdoing
and corrupt conduct, thus hampering his use of the power over
woefully incompetent though honest officials. Competency and
efficiency as well as honesty are essentials of good government.
But both involve questions of degree, and in a democracy it cannot be assumed that elective officers are even supposed to be the
most competent or most efficient obtainable. Nor is there any
set standard of competency or efficiency which may be assumed to
have been a condition of the electorate's choice. As most of the
1°9In re Application for Removal of Nash, (1920) 147 Minn. 383, 390-391,
181 N. W. 570, 573. See also State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, (1911) 116
Minn. 313, 321, 133 N. W. 857, 860: "Rulings on evidence may be considered,
but a 0strict compliance with legal procedure is not required."
11 See generally Stephens, Administrative Tribunals and the Rules of
Evidence; 1 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., 21-54; Wigniore, 1934 Supp., 4-14;
Ross, The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings
before Workmen's Compensation Proceedings, (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev.
263; Sherman, Evidence and Proof Under Workmen's Compensation Laws,
(1920) 68 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 203. Under 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec.
4313, the same rule has been applied to court review of workmen's compensation proceedings, see McDaniel v. City of Benson, (1926) 167 Minn. 407,
408, 209 N. W. 26.
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officers enumerated in the removal statute are elective, to construe
very broadly the terms "malfeasance and nonfeasance" so as to
include therein ordinary incompetency and inefficiency, would be
to some extent to modify the purpose of other constitutional and
statutory provisions in making such officers elective. It would
seem therefore that in all three aspects of its review by certiorari
of the governor's removal power the supreme court has followed
criteria which, balancing all interests, including that of the electorate, are fundamentally sound. In no aspect of its review has it
shown any inclination on its own part in the direction of hamstringing administration.
B. Veterans' Preference.-The Minnesota veterans' prefererence law11' provides that "in every public department 1 3
and upon all public works in the state . . . and the counties,
cities and towns"13 thereof" honorably discharged soldiers, sailors,
and marines who have served in time of war "shall be entitled to
preference in appointments, emplo);ment and promotion over other
applicants therefor."' "
It specifically excepts "the position of
private secretary or deputy of any official or department, or . . .
any person holding a strictly confidential relation to the appointing
officer."" 5 In case a veteran applicant's right to preference is
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs. 4368-4369.
" Held not to include school employees of any sort. Holmquist v.
Independent School Dist. of Virginia, (1930) 181 Minn. 23. 24, 231 N. W.
406. 3
"L Held to include villages. State ex rel. Castel v. Village of Chisholm,
(1928) 4 173 Minn. 485, 490, 217 N. W. 681, 683.
3. As interpreted, the statute "intends that the soldier applicant, to be
entitled to preferential appointment, shall be capable of performing the duties
of the position in a reasonably efficient manner. It does not intend that a soldier
shall have a preference if he can perform the duties of the position merely
after a fashion, though not with genuine efficiency. If the applicant has the
degree of fitness stated, his relative efficiency, when compared with that of
his own competitors, is unimportant." State ex rel. Meehan v. Empie. (1925)
164 Minn. 14, 16, 204 N. W. 572, 573.
i15Although the exception does not expressly refer to "heads" of departments, the reason for it has been thought to require the inclusion therein
of "heads" of departments and members of boards or commissions who have
to have been appointed before there really is any "department." State ex
rel. McOsker v. City Council of Minneapolis, (1926) 167 Minn. 240, 242. 208
N. W. 1005, 1006 (act held inapplicable to city clerk) : "The language of
the title and of the law falls short of suggesting that public officers vested
with discretion in the performance of their duties, not subject to direction from
superior authority but on the contrary possessing the necessary authority to
appoint clerks and subordinates, were contemplated as coming within the
act;" State ex rel. Michie v. Walleen, (1932) 185 Minn. 329, 330, 241 N. W.
318 (act held inapplicable for same reasons to county engineer). But compare State ex rel. Tamminen v. City of Eveleth, (1933) 189 Minn. 229, 231,
249 N. W. 184, 186 (act held applicable to "position of chief bookkeeper and
office worker of a deputy clerk character") ; State ex rel. Trevarthen v.
1111
2
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violated in the making of an appointment, the law provides that
he shall be entitled "to a right of action therefor in any court of
competent jurisdiction for damages, and also for a remedy for
mandamus for righting the wrong." A veteran once appointed
may not be removed "except for incompetency or misconduct shown
after a hearing, upon due notice, upon stated charges, and with
the right of such employe or appointee to review by writ of
certiorari." But by the express terms of the statute, mandamus
is a remedy concurrent with certiorari in the event of a wrongful
removal; and most of the veterans' preference cases have been
raised by mandamus.""
Extending as it does to local as well as state administration, the
City of Eveleth, (1929) 179 Minn. 99, 102, 228 N. W. 447, 448 (held applicable to position of superintendent of waterworks). That the exception
for employment of a "strictly confidential" character will be rather strictly
construed is shown by State ex rel. Blaski v. Fisher, (1935) 194 Minn. 75, 78,
259 N. W. 694, 695-696, holding the position of assistant fire chief not within it:
"Naturally, a certain degree of confidence must be observed by all members
of the department, and the higher the rank the higher is the degree of confidence, but we are convinced that the confidential relationship existing between an assistant fire chief and the chief is not such as the legislature contemplated."
ll8 As a method of reviewing the substantive grounds of a refusal to appoint, or of a removal, mandamus has thus been extended in connection with
veterans' preference beyond the common law limitations precluding it from trying title to public office, see State ex rel. Erickson v. Magie, (1931) 183 Minn.
60, 61-62, 235 N. W. 526; Mechem, Public Officers 653. In all mandamus proceedings in the district courts the return is no longer conclusive, as at common
law; and the writ and answer are to be "construed and amended in the same
manner as pleadings in a civil action, and issues thereby joined shall be tried,
and further proceedings had, as in a civil action." State ex rel. Tracy v. Cooley,
(1894) 58 Minn. 514, 518, 60 N. W. 338; 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9729;
see also State ex rel. McGill v. Cook, (1912) 119 Minn. 407, 408-410, 138 N. W.
432, 433. In theory the proceeding is original rather than appellate, new evidence may be introduced, and jury trial may be had if requested. See 2 Mason's
1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9733. For the reason that "The constitution only authorizes the legislature to confer upon the supreme court original jurisdiction in
cases in which the remedy by mandamus would have been available at common
law," see Lauritsen v. Seward, (1906) 99 Minn. 313, 323, 109 N. W. 404, 408,
the district courts now have exclusive original jurisdiction of all mandamus
cases except where the writ is directed to a district court or the judge thereof in
his official capacity. 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9732. From the veteran's
point of view mandamus may seem preferable to certiorari because of the opportunity to introduce new evidence before a jury. But as the cases discussed
in the text show, the jury in a mandamus proceeding or suit for salary will
not be allowed to substitute its own judgment for that of the appointing or removing officer, and the only question is whether there is evidence before the
court reasonably sufficient to sustain his action. See State ex rel. Meehan v.
Empie, (1925) 164 Minn. 14, 16-18, 204 N. W. 572, 574. It must follow that
even with a jury there is no question, except as to credibility of witnesses or
special defenses such as a claim of abandonment by the plaintiff of his rights to
the office, see Schlawr v. City of St. Paul, (1916) 132 Minn. 238, 242, 156 N. W.
283, 284, for which the trial court or an appellate court may not substitute its
own independent judgment for that of the jury.
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veterans' preference law is the most pervading single civil tenure
provision yet enacted in Minnesota. While its provisions have been
held in specific instances to be superseded by subsequent legislation
conferring an absolute removal power,"' or by the civil service
provisions of municipal home rule charters and rules established
thereunder, 1 " the law has since been amended so as to provide for
its application "notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in
any other existing law or in any city charter relating thereto ;,i10
with further directions that "No provision of any subsequent act
. . . shall be construed as inconsistent . . . unless and except
only so far as expressly provided in said subsequent act" and that
"Every city charter provision hereafter adopted which is inconsistent . . . shall be void to the extent of such inconsistency."' 20
The law itself has been said to be "in the nature of a civil service
law," 12 on the idea that "even if efficiency and the good of the
service alone are considered,"' 22 the training and discipline accompanying military service in war are well calculated to assure
"courage, constancy, habits of obedience, and fidelity, which are
2:
valuable qualifications for any public office or employment.'
Without discussing the soundness of this assumption, the lav at
least establishes a principle of tenure based on competency which
is defective only in its restriction to veterans. Whatever criticisms may be leveled at veteran preference in appointment are
hardly applicable to the provisions securing tenure to veterans once
appointed who prove capable and efficient in the performance of
their duties.
"1TSee State ex rel. Allen v. Rush, (1915) 131 Minn. 190, 192, 154 N. W.
947-948; State ex rel. Kinler v. Rines, (1931) 185 Minn. 49, 51-52, 239 N. W.

670, 671.
118 See State ex rel. Schultz v. Scott, (1925) 163 Minn. 190, 192, 203 N. W.

State ex rel. Giles v. Scott, (1927) 171 Minn. 208-209, 213 N. W. 738.
774, 775;
119Minn. Laws 1931, ch. 347, sec. 1.
12OMinn. Laws 1931, ch. 347, sec. 2. Held not to be retroactive, State ex
rel. Abati v. McDonald, (1932) 185 Minn. 194, 240 N. W. 361. The court in
this case sustained a rule of the firemen's civil service commission of Hibbing
making 35 the maximum age of eligibility for appointment to the fire department, despite a provision of the veterans' preference law that age shall not
disqualify so long as it does not render the applicant "incompetent to perform
the duties of the position applied for." On the same facts a different result
might now be reached, despite the desirability of a maximum age requirement in order to make a pension system effective.
121State ex rel. Castel v. Village of Chisholm, (1928) 173 Minn. 485, 489,
217 N.22 W. 681, 682.
1 State ex rel. Kangas v. McDonald, (1933) 188 Minn. 157, 161, 246
N. W. 900, 901.
123State ex rel. Kangas v. McDonald, (1933) 188 Minn. 157, 161, 246
N. W. 900, 901, quoting from Opinion of the Justices, (1896) 166 Mass. 589,
595, 44 N. E. 625, 627.
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Though the removal provisions are therefore of chief interest,
the extent to which the courts may review the appointing power
is involved at least indirectly as part of the general scheme of
effective sanctions. Prior to the insertion in the statute of tile
express provision for review by mandamus of a disregard of
preference rights in the making of an appointment, it had been
held that a veteran applicant could not maintain mandanlus to
compel the discharge of a non-veteran appointed inhis stead, and
his own al)pointment, for the reason that this would devolve the
appointing power upon the courts.12
And a veteran not real)pointed at the expiration of the term of his first appointment was
held to have "no greater rights to the office than as though he had
never held the office," and a remedy by mandamus was denied
-although the only reason given in the return to the writ for the
failure to reappoint relator was "that it would be unsatisfactory to
the friends of the state senator from Goodhue county.

125

Under

the present statute it is clear that a review of the appointing power
or of a failure to reappoint is to some extent devolved upon the
courts. State ex rel. Kangas v. McDonald 20 was a mandamus
proceeding to compel the firemen's civil service commission of
Hibbing to certify the relator's name for appointment. Under
the optional firemen's civil service law' 2 7 which Hibbing had adopted, the civil service commission was directed to establish rules for
the "creation and maintenance of lists of eligible candidates after
successful examination in order of their standing in the examination"' 128 and for the "certification of the name standing highest on
124State ex rel. Mortensen v. Copeland, (1898) 74 Minn. 371,375, 77 N. W.

221, 222: "The appointing power is in the board, and not in the cou ts: and.
even if the latter could compel the former to remove the present incumbent.
they could not compel the board to appoint the relator. The board would -till
have discretion as to what soldier or sailor they would appoint ... if a writ of
mandamus was to issue, it would be merely to compel the board to execute the
mandates of the law, not in favor of the relator in particular, but in favor of
all persons within its provisions. This would be merely to duplicate the act
of the legislature in enacting the statute."
' 2 State ex rel.
Hawes v. Barrows, (1898) 71 Minn. 178, 181, 184, 73
N. W. 704-706. It was further "admitted that the relator was a competent person, and possessed the necessary qualifications to discharge the dutie; of said
office." The office was that of deputy oil inspector, to which the statute may
have been inapplicable anyway. On similar facts as to a position within the
statute a different result would now be reached. State ex rel. Castel v. Village of Chisholm. (1928) 173 Minn. 485, 490. 217 N. W. 681, 682; State ex
rel.
Trevarthen v. City of Eveleth, (1929) 179 Minn. 99, 102, 228 N. \V. 447.
448.
1'"(1933) 188 Minn. 157, 246 N. W. 900.
12 7Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 57.
-'2Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 57, sec. 8 (d).
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the appropriate list to fill any vacancy."'12 The rules so established
provided for a passing mark of 75 and for the certification of
two more names than positions to be filled, thus reserving to the
appointing officer a limited field of selection based on considerations other than examination ranking.130 Kangas had a qualifying
mark of 85.24, but stood 19th on a list of 33 eligibles, and at a
time when there were eight positions to be filled, the commission
certified the ten names highest on the list, thereby excluding
Kangas, a veteran, but including six non-veterans. The court held
that in the case of a veteran attainment of the passing mark of
75 "establishes the qualification,"131 and directed certification of
Kangas' name ahead of the six non-veterans who had attained
higher marks. As three others of the 33 eligibles were in the
same position as Kangas, and one member of the fire department
had resigned in the meantime, the decision necessitated the discharge of three non-veterans already appointed."'2 A hard and
fast rule is established whereby in the certification of names by a
civil service commission all veterans who have attained the minimum passing mark must be included ahead of all non-veterans,
though within each group the examination ranking controls. The
appointing officer's field of selection may thus become limited to
veterans. But a civil service commission has an easy way of avoiding an extreme result by establishing a higher minimum qualifying mark, or by a stricter grading of examinations, for veterans
and non-veterans alike. So long as preference is accorded to
veterans who meet the commission's standard, a court will interfere
neither with the fixing of the standard nor the commission's determination whether a particular applicant, veteran or non-veteran,
has met it."s

Where the appointing officer may select from a larger certified
list than the number of positions to be filled, or without being lim'
129Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 57, sec. 8 (f).
"sOWhether this was permissible under sec. 8(f) of the statute was not
considered by the court in its opinion. The rule as adopted by the commission
embodies a usual principle of civil service appointment; and in the light of the
discretion otherwise conferred by the statute upon the commission, the wording
of sec. 8(f) should not be construed to preclude it from adopting such a rule.
13'At 188 Minn. 161, 246 N. W. 901.
"'As to this aspect of the decision see State ex rel. Thornton v. Ritchel,
(1934) 192 Minn. 63. 255 N. W. 627, and below pp. 760-61 of text.
'1Thefixing of the minimum standard of qualification appears to be confided entirely to the Commission's discretion. That a court will very rarely if
ever interfere with a commission's determination of whether an applicant has
passed the qualifying examination, see Mitchell v. McKeyitt, (1932) 128 Cal.
App. 458, 17 P. (2d) 789; noted (1934) 7 So. Cal. L. Rev. 477; see also (1931)
17 Cornell L. Q. 103.
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ited to a certified list, as is true wherever there is no separate civil
service law applicable, his selection does not depend on the nathematical standards that governed the commission's certification in
State ex rel. Kangas v. McDonald. He may consider other aspects
of the veteran applicant's qualifications. And in all cases of refusal to make an original appointment that have come before the
courts the veteran has been denied relief. In State ex rel. Meehan
v. Em pie,"3 4 a mandamus proceeding to compel the city council of
Virginia to appoint relator to the position of marketmaster, tile
court in denying relief pointed out through Dibell, J., the following
criteria of review:
"The question of qualification or fitness is first and primarily
for the appointing body. The trial court on mandamus, or this
court on review, cannot substitute its own view of the fact. Only
when the appointing power declines to investigate, declines to
apply the law, or proceeds with manifest arbitrariness, or some
equivalent thereto, can relief be had by mandamus. The court
does not determine the question of fitness. Evidence of it may be
competent in determining whether the appointing body applied the
law at all or, in applying it, proceeded with manifest arbitrariness ...
"The evidence was taken upon the theory, largely at least, that
the issue was whether the relator was qualified for the appointment.
The real question was whether the council applied the law at all,
making the required investigation, or with manifest arbitrariness
determined that the relator was not fit. The finding of the trial
court is that the relator is possessed of the requisite fitness. That
does not determine that he is entitled to the employment. The trial
court, or this court, may think him fit, and yet concede that a
contrary belief of the council is sustained, or at least not so arbitrary as to vitiate its finding.' ' 3
So also the court has emphasized that "Substantially every
member of the council knew Moilan" 136 and their testimony that
they did not consider him fit for the position; and has held that
even though there is evidence "casting suspicion on acts of individual members" of the appointing body, 3" or evidence that a
majority of its members attended the meeting at which the appointment was to be made with a predetermination to vote against the
veteran applicant in favor of a non-veteran, 88 their appointment
'34(1925) 164 Minn. 14, 204 N. W. 572.
135164

841.
841.

Minn. 16-18, 204 N. W. 574.

186State ex rel. Moilan v. Brandt, (1929) 178 Minn. 277, 278, 226 N. W.
'3 7 State ex rel. Moilan v. Brandt, (1929) 178 Minn. 277, 279, 226 N. W.
18 State ex rel. Bloomquist v. Barker, (1933) 190 Minn. 370, 371-372, 251

N. W. 673, 674.
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will not be disturbed so long as the veteran was allowed to present
his case and there is evidence before the court reasonably justifying a conclusion that he was "not qualified to fill the position . . .
and render reasonably efficient service."' 3 9 The statute requires
no specific formalities in the investigation and hearing to be accorded in the making of an appointment, and since the only record
upon which a court passes is the one made in the mandamus
proceeding, the case would be extraordinary in which the appointing power is unable retroactively to show reasonable justification
of its action. The result is that veterans' preference in the making of original appointments has no very effective legal sanction,
except to the extent that it is aided by civil service legislation
circumscribing the appointing power's selection by a certified list
that will be required to include all veterans who have met a commission's qualifying standard.
A refusal to reappoint a veteran at the expiration of the term
of his first appointment, though at first treated the same as a
refusal origiffally to appoint,'4 0 is somewhat more analogous to a
removal; and a court has more adequate standards to judge of
his competency and efficiency as shown by past service. If "It
stands admitted that plaintiff was rendering efficient and entirely
satisfactory service, " 14 that is an end of the matter and a court
may direct reappointment. It is submitted that the same result
must follow wherever the appointing power is unable to show
reasonable justification of a conclusion that the veteran was itol
"rendering efficient and entirely satisfactory service." The burden
is somewhat larger, and more confined to specific instances of incompetency, inefficiency, or misconduct, than in the case of showing reasonable grounds for believing that an as yet untried applicant would prove unfit.1 4 2 If the appointing power proceeds
without considering the veteran's claim to reappointment, a court
may of its own independent judgment determine that the relator
"had performed his duties in an efficient and satisfactory manner"
and direct reappointment.4 4 A new city council on coming into
239 State ex rel. Bloomquist v. Barker, (1933) 190 Minn. 370, 372, 251
N. W.40673, 674.
1 State ex rel. Hawes v. Barrows (1898) 71 Minn. 178, 73 N. W. 704.
141State ex rel. Castel v. Village of Chisholm, (1928) 173 Minn. 485, 49U.
217 N.2 W. 681, 682.
14 The appointing power has already resolved this question in the negative
in making the original appointment, and it may perhaps be presumed that the
same condition continues until negatived by reasonably sufficient evidence.

'4sState ex rel. Trevarthen v. City of Eveleth, (1929) 179 Minn. 99, 102,

228 N. W. 447, 448. This is hardly to devolve the appointing power upon the

court for the reason stated in footnote 142.
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office may not refuse a veteran's application for reappointment under pretext of abolishing his position, at the same time appointing
a non-veteran to perform the duties of the same position under a
different name."' Where the question is one of promotion rather
than reappointment, and as between a veteran and non-veteran
applicant "The qualifications of each are admitted," as based on
past service, a court may compel promotion of the veteran, although
by civil service rules otherwise applicable the non-veteran was the
45
one entitled on the basis of seniority.1
The removal section of the statute provides for (1) notice;
(2) stated charges involving incompetency or misconduct; (3)
a hearing; and (4) that "The burden of proving incompetency or
misconduct shall rest upon the party alleging the same.'

4

Tile

only veterans' removal cases dealing with the notice and hearing
requirements have involved their entire omission rather than their
adequacy; and in such cases a court may without further ado direct
reinstatement until such time as these procedural requisites have
been complied with."4" It has been so held even in ihe case of a
veteran illegally appointed in violation of valid civil service requirements ;148 although by all previous decisions such a person
'4 State ex rel. Tamminen v. City of Eveleth, (1933) 189 Minn. 229, 232,
234, 249 N. W. 184, 185. Since the preference law does not require that a nonveteran validly appointed be discharged to make room for a subsequent veteran
applicant, it is submitted that the appointing power should always be permitted.
though it cannot be compelled in the absence of other tenure provisions, to
re-appoint a previous non-veteran incumbent in preference to veteran applicants. Treating a failure to re-appoint, in the cases of veterans and nonveterans alike, as more in the nature of a removal, avoids the difficulty
which the courts have had in determining whether an appointment, the duration of which is not otherwise fixed by law, expires with the coming into
office of a new elective council, or with the appointment of a new superior, etc.,
see State ex rel. Tamminen v. City of Eveleth, supra, at 189 Minn. 235, 249
N. W. 187; State ex rel. Castel v. Village of Chisholm, (1928) 173 Minn. 485,
489-490, 217 N. W. 681, 682-683; State ex rel. Hawes v. Barrows, (1898) 71
Minn. 178, 183-184, 73 N. W. 704, 705-706; and also avoids the "juggling" to
prevent consideration of veteran applicants to replace previous non-veteran
incumbents, which the new council on coming into office felt necessary and the
court overlooked in State ex rel. Cote v. Village of Bovey, (1934) 191 Minn.
401, 254
N. W. 456.
14 State ex rel. Blaski v. Fisher (1935), 194 Minn. 75, 77, 259 N. W. 694.
'461
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4369.
47
State ex rel. Bozicevich v. City of Eveleth, (1935) 194 Minn. 44, 47, 260
N. W.48223, 224.
l Johnson v. Pugh, (1922) 152 Minn. 437, 439-440, 189 N. W. 257-258
(the veteran had failed to pass the qualifying examination, but under the civil
service rules had been given a 60-day temporary appointment which had expired) : "Under the circumstances stated, it may have been contrary to the
civil service rules to retain him on the police force after the expiration of 60
days, but it was shown that the rules were disregarded in other cases and apparently respondent was the only policeman singled out for removal because
he had not passed the examination. In our opinion appellants were bound to
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has no right to continue in his position or to compensation for
services rendered. 49 As to the adequacy of the notice and hearing,
the requirement of specific charges, and the right to amend the
charges or to rely on grounds not embraced therein so long as
there is no unfair element of surprise or lack of opportunity to
reply, about the same rules are no doubt applicable as were found
true of the governor's removal power in the preceding section.
However, the statute contains no reference to "competent evidence," and the courts have not implied a requirement that there
be any minimum of technically competent evidence sufficient to
sustain the removal order. 50 The removal authority's handling
of evidential matters should be significant only as it may bear on
the adequacy or fairness of the hearing or fail to provide a reasonable support in fact of legally sufficient grounds. The requirement
as to the burden of proving incompetency or misconduct is meaningless, since the party alleging the same is usually the primary
trier of fact;' 5 ' and it in no way affects the usual rule of court
review of administrative action. In State ex rel. Pete v. Eklund,'
the argument was made that the requirement "so enlarges the
scope of review . . . under a writ of certiorari that [the court]
becomes triers of the fact and must weigh the evidence, pass upon
the credibility of witnesses, and determine the preponderance of
the evidence." The court held that the statute
"presents the same question for review as is frequently raised
where it is claimed the evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict
of a jury or a finding of a court or tribunal. We determine here
whether there was evidence reasonably sufficient to sustain the
verdict or findings of the court or trier of the facts. . ..
We
comply with the mandate of the statute and cannot justify respondent's removal
without a hearing on the sole ground that his appointment was temporary with-

in the meaning of the civil service rules." See Note, (1934) 18 MNix.Nsor.
LAW Rvmiw
837.
' 49 See Larsen v. City of St. Paul, (1901) 83 Minn. 473, 475, 86 N. W. 459;
O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1898) 72 Minn. 256, 75 N. W. 375; Yorks v. City
of St. Paul, (1895) 62 Minn. 250, 252, 64 N. W. 565; Stoner, Recovery of

Salary5 by a De Facto Officer, (1912) 10 Mich. L. Rev. 178, 291.
' OIn State ex rel. Pete v. Eklund, (Minn. 1936) 264 N. W. 682, 684-685,

where the proceeding was by certiorari to review the record as certified by the
removing tribunal, the court was satisfied that the evidence "Taken as a whole,"
without reference being made to the technical competency of any part thereof.

was sufficient to sustain the removal order. Where review is by mandamus or
a salary suit, the removing officer or body apparently is bound by the technical

rules of evidence in establishing in such a proceeding sufficient justification of
his or its order. See Edie v. School Dist. No. 1 of Koochiching County, (1931)
183 Minn. 522, 524-525,237 N. W. 177, 178.
151See State ex rel. Nelson v. Board of Public Welfare, (1921)
322, 328, 183 N. W. 521, 524.

152(Minn. 1936) 264 N. W. 682.

149 Minn.
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have held substantially the same rule applicable in cases where
the relevant statute was silent as to burden of proof,"
and sustained the removal order although it also found evidence
in the record "which would have sustained findings . . . that
[the] charges were unfounded or unimportant and lacked substantial merit."'15
In the above case the county board had removed relator as
road patrol foreman on grounds the more important of which, as
considered by the court, were that he had ordered road grading to
be done on Sundays "when not necessary and until stopped by the
superintendent," and that he had "had no experience in operating
the heavy grader used in this work and did not know how to
operate this expensive machine." The court sustained the legal
sufficiency of the first ground not for moral or religious reasons,
but because "Sunday work was paid for by the county at one and
one-half times as much as work on other days." As to the second,
in reply to relator's explanation that he was furnished an inexperienced man to operate the machine, the court pointed out that
"If the man who was to operate the grader under plaintiff's supervision was inexperienced and did not know how to operate the
machine, it might be quite important that the plaintiff, his supervisor, should be able to instruct the man how to operate it and do
his work."
It is apparent that "incompetency or misconduct" have a wider
application than "malfeasance or nonfeasance," and are in no way
limited to corrupt conduct or intentional wrongdoing. From
analogous cases interpreting the legal content of "cause" as a
restriction on the removal power, occasional instances of mere
bad judgment or honest mistake should not constitute legally sufficient grounds of removal. 15' It should be required in each case
that the "ordinary decencies" of judicial fairness be accorded, and
that the instances of incompetency or misconduct relied on reasonably justify a conclusion that the officer in the performance of his
15S (Minn. 1936) 264 N. W. 683-684.
15 4
See Townsend v. Common Council of Sauk Centre, (1898)

71 Minm.

397, 382-383, 74 N. W. 150, 152, where the council, having power to remove an
elective mayor for cause, removed him for having refused to sign an order in
payment of property which the council had purchased: "... if it should be conceded that the proceedings were in all respects regular, and that it was his duty
to sign the order, still the fact that he was mistaken as to his duty in this one
instance would not show that he was generally incompetent to perform the
duties of the office to such an extent as to warrant his removal on the ground of
incompetency. There are, indeed, few officers who are not likely at some time
or another to commit an error of judgment in deciding as to what is their
duty."
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duties has not fulfilled the expectations properly actuating his appointment to the position in question.' 5 Court review thus limited
is not so significant in the individual case where it is sought as in
the constant restraint which knowledge of its availability may
place upon the removal power in cases that never reach the courts.
Limitations on the removal power, in whatever connection, do
not prevent the proper authorities
"from terminating the employment of an appointee by abolishing
the office or position which he held, if the action abolishing it be
taken in good faith for some legitimate purpose, and is not a
mere subterfuge to oust him from his position.""'
Here even the procedural requisites to the removal power are
dispensed with. In State ex rel. Boyd v. Matson,'" five of sixteen
operators in the police and fire alarm telegraph bureau of St.
Paul had been discharged for lack of work and funds. The five
included relator, a non-veteran, who was senior in point of service
to four veterans who were retained. The home rule charter of St.
Paul provided that in the event of lay-offs "for lack of work or
funds or for other causes," employees were to be discharged in
the inverse order of their seniority. In directing that relator be
reinstated, thereby necessitating the discharge of a veteran, the
court pointed out that.as the preference act had never required the
discharge of a non-veteran to make way for the original appointment of a veteran, so also it did not require
"that the seniority rights created by such [civil service] rules
shall give way to the preference rights given by the act . . . as

both can stand together and be given a fair and reasonable operation, effect must be given to both. . . Reducing the force from
sixteen to eleven, is in effect abolishing five positions..... By
force of the soldier's preference act, the positions held by the
soldiers could not be abolished so long as a position held by a nonsoldier, appointed at the same time or later, was continued. This
accords to the soldiers the same preference right they had when
15Compare State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council of Duluth. (1893) 5;
Minn. 238, 244, 55 N. W. 118, 120: "The cause must be one which specially
relates to and affects the administration of the office, and must be restricted to
something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and inter-sts of
the public.... In the absence of any statutory specification the sufficiency of
the cause should be determined with reference to the character of the office, and
the qualifications necessary to fill it."
25GState ex rel. Boyd v. Matson, (1923) 155 Minn. 137, 141-142, 193 N. W.
30, 32. See also State ex rel. Tamminen v. City of Eveleth, (1933) 189 Minn.
229, 232-234, 249 N. W. 184, 185; State ex rel. Culver v. Board of Public Welfare, (1928) 174 Minn. 571, 572-573, 219 N. W. 919; State ex rel. Nelson v.
Board of Public Welfare, (1921) 149 Minn. 322, 183 N. W. 521; Byrne v.
City of St. Paul, (1917) 137 Minn. 235, 163 N. W. 162.
157(1923) 155 Minn. 137, 193 N. W. 30.
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they made their original applications-a right to be preferred over
all others not in the service before they applied-but not a right
to have old employes removed to make places for them.""'
C. Firemen's and Policemen's Tenure.-The legislature in
1929 enacted optional firemen's" 0 and policemen's' 00 civil service
laws applicable to cities not of the first class and villages of over
two thousand inhabitants having regularly employed paid departments. The method of appointment limiting the appointing officer's selection to names certified by the civil service commission
in the order of their examination ranking has already been stated
in connection with the effect thereon of the veterans' preference
law. A six months' probationary period is provided during which
the removal power is unlimited,' unless the employee is a veteran.
The laws do not say who may exercise the removal power during
the probationary period ;102 and although thereafter it is in the civil
service commission rather than in the appointing or superior officer, "the power of any officer to suspend a subordinate for a
reasonable period not exceeding sixty days for the purpose of
discipline, or pending investigation of charges when he deems such
suspension advisable" is still preserved. 63 If the suspension is
made pending the determination of a removal proceeding by the
civil service commission, and its decision is in favor of the employee, his pay for the period of suspension is restored.' 0' Employees who have survived the probationary period may be removed
155 Minn. 142-143, 193 N. W. 32.
I'9Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 57. Constitutionality sustained, State ex rel. lenson v. Peterson, (1930) 180 Minn. 366, 230 N. W. 830.
16OMinn. Laws 1929, ch. 299. Constitutionality sustained, Naeseth v. Village of Hibbing, (1932) 185 Minn. 526, 242 N. W. 6. As to all provisions here
material the two acts are entirely identical.
l6lMinn. Laws 1929, ch. 57, sec. 9; ch. 299, sec. 7. This was construed to
give an unlimited power of removal, except as modified by veterans' preference,
over hold-over employees from an earlier regime, until they had served more
than six months under the new law. Saholt v. City of Rochester, (1932) 185
Minn. 510, 513, 242 N. W. 4, 5-6. Compare a similar construction of the civil
service provisions of St. Paul's first home rule charter, in State ex rel. Getchell
v. O'Connor, (1900) 81 Minn. 79,86-87,83 N. W. 498, 500. Following the Saholt
Case the policemen's law was amended so as to provide that "Any police officer
regularly employed at the time of the creation of the civil service commission
shall automatically come under the jurisdiction of the civil service commission."
Minn. Laws 1933, ch. 197, sec. 17. See McDougall v. Baich, (1935) 194 Minn.
550, 261 N. W. 180 (law as amended held inapplicable to employee of separately organized park board, although employed to perform police duties and
authorized
by the village council to wear a police badge and make arrests).
62
1
1n Saholt v. City of Rochester, (1932) 185 Minn. 510, 242 N. W. 4, the
removal was by the commission.
163Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 57, sec. 9; ch. 299, sec. 7.
10 4 Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 57, sec. 14; ch. 299, sec. 12. The result of Martin
v. County of Dodge, (1920) 146 Minn. 129, 178 N. W. 167 is thus avoided.
158At
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only by the civil service commission, for cause constituting "in-

efficiency, breach of duty, or misconduct," "upon written charges
and after an opportunity to be heard" at a hearing open to the
public and with a right to compel the attendance of witnesses.'
A member of the commission who himself brings the charges is
disqualified to sit at the hearing.1 6 Following the hearing an
order by the commission for suspension, reduction, or removal must
be presented in writing to the employee, who by notice to the
secretary of the commission within ten days thereafter may appeal
to the district court, which, without a jury, is directed to determine
the question, "Upon the evidence was the order of the commission
reasonable ?,167
These provisions are the most liberal in favor of employees to
whom they apply of any civil tenure provisions yet enacted in
Minnesota. The phrasing of the question, "Upon the evidence was
the order of -the commission reasonable?" may be of wider signifitance than had it been phrased "Was the order of the commission reasonably supported by the evidence ?" The latter phrasing has a well theorized legal meaning, whereby credibility of witnesses is excluded, and the standard of reasonableness is the last
outpost at which a court can conceive of a sane mind not its own
reaching the conclusion of the tribunal below. The former may
admit of a more subjective determination-within the whole wide
range of reasonableness. 0 8 In another connection, in a salary
165 Mim. Laws 1929, ch. 57, secs. 9, 13, 14; ch. 299, secs. 7, 11, 12. The removal provisions are held applicable to department "heads" as well as subordinates, Naeseth v. Village of Hibbing, (1932) 185 Minn. 526, 5279, 242 N. W. 6.
7, against the argument based on the provision that a removal order of the
commission "shall be forthwith certified to the chief or other appointed or
superior officer, and will be forthwith enforced by such officer." Minn. Law
1929, ch. 57, sec. 9; ch. 299, sec. 7.
166Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 57, sec. 13; ch. 299, sec. 11. Compare Stockwell v. Township Board, (1871) 22 Mich. 341, where the same result was
reached as a matter of common law by implication from the "judicial" character .of the removal proceeding. But except where, as here, the removal
power is in a separate and independent commission, the requirement of a
hearing does not prevent the appointing officer in whom the removal power
otherwise rests from being both prosecutor and judge. See State ex rel.
Nelson v. Board of Public Welfare, (1921) 149 Minn. 322, 328, 183 N. W.
521, 524. 'For a criticism of this common characteristic of administrative
action, see Blachly and Oatman, Administrative Legislation and Adjudication
241-242.
'0 7Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 67, sec. 13; ch. 299, sec. 11.
'0 sThe statutory phrasing suggests the question "would a reasonably
prudent man have so acted under the circumstances?" presented to the
jury in negligence cases. In the usual court review of administrative action
the question analogous to this has been answered by the administrative
tribunal with at least the same finality as though by a jury. That the
jury's function in negligence cases is very much akin to that of administra-
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suit by a teacher discharged under a statute limiting the school
board's power of removal to "cause," it has been held error to instruct the jury that it was for them to determine whether the
board "acted in a reasonable and proper manner in the determination of the question before them."' 1 9 In the same case the court
recognized that the proper question was whether the board had
"acted in bad faith or arbitrarily and capriciously upon the facts
before it or properly within its knowledge." But a finding not
reasonably supported by evidence or facts otherwise properly within the tribunal's knowledge is "arbitrary and baseless." 110 The case
suggests a difference between the two phrasings, and that the
question presented by the statutes for court determination, unless
restrictively interpreted, may be more akin to the usual jury question in negligence cases than to the usual question in court review
of either jury verdicts or administrative action.
As to the extent that the evidence before the commission, to
which in all events court review will be limited, may be required
to meet the tests of technical competency, the laws are silent.'
No cases involving review by appeal have appeared. 1 2 State ex
tive adjudication, in that the standards are largely created in the very
process
of their application, see Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts 605.
'8 9 Anderson v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 144, (Minn. 1936) 264
N. W. 784-785: "By so much .

.

. there is permitted a judicial intrusion

upon an executive function, and the judiciary is permitted, through the
medium of a jury, to review and reverse executive action, whereas the only
proper function of the courts in respect thereto is to inquire whether the
executive has authority in law for the action. If there is such authority
and there is any basis for the action taken, the executive determination of
the problem should not be nullified judicially, for to do so would make the
judicial decision paramount over that of the executive in a matter which,
by express law, has been made an executive function." The trial court had
properly warned the jury that the standard of reasonableness was not their
own but that of "reasonable and competent men." The result of the case is
that court review of administrative removals, though by mandamus or a
suit for salary wherein jury trial is otherwise available, and unless expressly
enlarged by statute, does not present a jury question for which the trial
or appellate court may not substitute its own independent judgment for that
of the jury. Of course the absence of an independent jury question does
not in Minnesota preclude a court from seeking the aid of. a jury in its
own determination
of such issues as are here involved.
1T0 See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville
R. Co., (1913) 227 U. S. 88, 91, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 186, 57 L. Ed. 431.
There is seldom much difference in meaning between saying that an administrative determination is final so long as it is reasonably supported by
evidence, and saying that it is final so long as it is supported by any evidence.
Both expressions come down to saying that it is final so long as it is not
arbitrary, baseless, or capricious, with variations depending on the extent to
which the administrative tribunal may be held entitled to act on its own
presumed
knowledge.
' 7 'As to the significance of the rules of technical competency in situations
already2 considered, see above, pp. 746, 755.
'7 The provision for direct appeal would exclude review by certiorari, see
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rel. Thornton v. Ritcliel7 was a mandamus proceeding by one of
the three non-veterans discharged from the fire department of
Hibbing as a result of the decision in State ex rel. Kangas v.
McDonald.1' 7 Of the eight appointed at the same time as relator
there were three non-veterans who had made lower marks in the
qualifying examination than he had, one of whom was retained in
preference to him..'7 In directing relator's reinstatement the court
pointed out:
"While the commissioners testified that they spent an hour or
more in considering which men to discharge, they presented not
a single fact or reason for discharging relator in preference to men
having lower examination grades. They presented no charges.
They admitted that relator's services were entirely satisfactory,
and that he was fully as efficient as any of the men retained . . .
it was the duty of the commission to give effect to the rating of
relator on the certified list and not to discharge him in preference
to men having a lower rating, unless some cause was shown for
granting preference to men with such lower rating. . . . The
efficiency of the fire department should be best served by retaining
the men who, upon examination had, showed the highest qualifications ...
"We recognize the rule that the courts cannot by mandamus
control the exercise of discretion vested in an official or commission of this kind; but the courts have the power to determine
whether, on a given state of facts and under the law and rules
8
applicable thereto, a commission or official had any discretion."17
The court might well have indicated further that, although the
removal provisions are otherwise inapplicable to necessitated layoffs, they may become strictly applicable to a selection of the ones
to lay off if based on any other considerations than seniority in
service, or veterans' preference and examination ranking as applied to employees appointed at the same time.' 7
State ex rel. Hardy v. Clough, (1896) 64 Minn. 378, 380, 67 N. W. 202,
203. For the same reason mandamus would be unavailable to review the
substantive grounds of a removal by the commission, but it may still lie to
compel the required hearing where none has been accorded, see State ex
rel. Thornton v. Ritchel, (1934) 192 Minn. 63, 68, 255 N. W. 627, 630.
171(1934) 192 Minn. 63, 255 N. W. 627.
274(1933) 188 Minn. 157, 246 N. W. 900, for which see above, pp. 750-51.
'"7The rules provided only that in the event of necessitated lay-offs,
"through lack of work or funds, or for other cause," employees should be

laid off in the inverse order of their seniority.
176At 192 Minn. 67-68; 255 N. W. 629-630 (last italics supplied).
' 771t should follow, under the rules as to necessitated lay-offs of em-

ployees against whom no permanent removal proceedings have been instituted, that a court may by mandamus direct their reinstatement in the
same order of seniority, veterans' preference, examination ranking, in preference to wholly new applicants.
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D. Teachers' Tenure.-The removal power as to teachers in
the public elementary schools is determined with reference, first, to
statutory restrictions specifically applicable," 8 and second, to the
terms of the contract the employing body is statutorily authorized
to make. 17 0 In some cases the removal power has been held to be
enlarged rather than curtailed by the terms of the individtal contract of employment. A certificate to teach is prerequisite;"'
and a contract without one has no validity.18' Moreover, every
teacher's contract is subject to termination by the revocation or
suspension of the certificate in a proceeding which since 1929
must be before the State Board of Education ol the written complaint of a school board, county superintendent, or State Commissioner of Education." 2 The hearing may be before the whole
17 Though not employees of a "public department" of the state or the
"counties, cities and towns thereof" within the veterans' preference law,
Holmquist v. Independent School Dist. of Virginia, (1930) 181 Minn. 23,
231 N. W. 406, school employees are "subject to the rules governing the
appointment and removal of subordinate officers and employes of municipal
corporations" in the respect that by such rules "the power to appoint . . .
carries with it the power to remove . . . at pleasure unless . . . restricted
by statutory law" or, it may be added, by the terms of a valid contract the
employing body was empowered to make. Oikari v. Independent School
Dist. No. 40, (1927) 170 Minn. 301, 302, 212 N. W. 598.
179A statutory authorization to "contract with necessary, qualified
teachers," 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 2815 (5), enables teachers' contracts to survive changes in membership of the employing body; with which
compare the result in Egan v. City of St. Paul, (1894) 57 Minn. 1, 5, 58
N. W. 267, 268-269 (custodian of public building appointed for two year
term held without recourse on contractural grounds against summary removal at end of first year, since appointing authority, though a continuing
body, was subject to individual changes in membership at end of each year
and therefore without power to make binding agreement for a longer period).
A school superintendent, unless specifically included, "is not a teacher" within the statutory authorization of school boards to make binding contracts for
definite periods of time. See Jensen, v. Independent Consol. School Dist.
No. 85, (1924) 160 Minn. 233, 234-237, 199 N. W. 911, 913: "The law
regulating the employment and discharge of the one does not relate to the
other . . . otherwise the board might tie the hands of its successors and
wrest from the control of the people the school which they are required to
support. . . . It cannot contract to keep him in office for any certain time.
It cannot renounce or agree not to exercise its power of removal at pleasure."
SOMinn. Laws 1929, ch. 388, sec. 2. By sees. 1 and 7 the requirement
is made specifically applicable to "principals, supervisors or superintendents,"
and by sec. 3 the issuance of certificates is vested solely in the State Board
of Education. The 1929 law supplants 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sees.
2900-2935 previously applicable.
lS'Ryan v. District No. 13 of Dakota County, (1881) 27 Minn 433, 434,
8 N. W. 146-147. Provisions otherwise limiting the removal power should
be inapplicable to the case of a teacher without the required certificate;
though compare Johnson v. Pugh, (1922) 152 Minn. 437, 189 N. W. 257.
18 2Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 388, sec. 11. The grounds of revocation or
suspension are limited to "a. Immoral character or conduct. b. Failure,
without justifiable cause, to teach for the term of his contract. c. Gross
inefficiency or willful neglect of duty. d. Affliction with active tuberculosis
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board, or a member thereof;183 but the decision is by the board,
and "shall be final."' 84 This, however, since all the attributes of
a quasi judicial determination are present, need not preclude a
remedy by certiorari against a failure to accord the procedural
requisites, or against an "arbitrary or baseless" determination."'
Under a previous statute the proceeding was in the first instance
before the county superintendent, with an appeal to the state
superintendent, whose action was to be "final."' 86
In State e.r
rel. Grubbs v. Schulz, s7 the proceeding had been before the state
superintendent in the first instance. On certiorari the supreme
court held that although the statutory procedure was exclusive, and
gave the state superintendent only appellate jurisdiction, the relator
had waived the irregularity by making his defense to the merits
without objection on this ground at the hearing before the state
superintendent. The court assumed that certiorari was otherwise
available for its proper purposes. 188
The limitations as to grounds and method of revoking or
suspending a teacher's certificate, which is the most drastic form
of removal in that it also bars employment in any other public
school in the state, neither precludes nor restricts otherwise existor some other communicable disease, while suffering from such disability."
(a) and (c) are somewhat more narrowly phrased than the corresponding
grounds of revocation or suspension in the earlier law. See 1 Mason's 1921
Minn. Stat. sec. 2927: " . . . . (a) Immoral character or conduct unbecoming a teacher.... (c) Inefficiency in teaching or in the management
of a school.
. . ." (Italics supplied for comparison.)
83

' The hearing is required to be public, if requested by the teacher, with
the right to representation by counsel. The testimony is required to be
sworn, although there is no other requirement as to evidential competency.
A complete record is required to be kept, and in the event that the conplaint has been brought by the Commissioner of Education, he is himself
disqualified to sit. Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 388, sec. 11.
3S4Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 388, sec. 11.
'85Compare Ridgway v. Vaughan, (1932) 187 Minn. 552, 553-554, 246
N. W. 115, allowing review by certiorari of a judgment of the municipal
court of Minneapolis in a case removed from the conciliation court, "though
the statute says there shall be no appeal" from the municipal court's judgment in such a case. 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 1382 (4) (d).
1861 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 2926.
187(1919) 142 Minn. 112, 171 N. W. 263.
ISsThe writ had issued directly from the Supreme Court. At 142
Minn. 113-114, 171 N. W. 264, the court pointed out through Hallam, J.:
"This court may undoubtedly entertain original jurisdiction by certiorari
in such a case. . . . It has, however, been the practice . . . to remit the
parties to a proper district court except in cases where general public
interest requires immediate determination. We see nothing to take this
out of the general rule. At the time this case came up for decision the
time for issuance of a new writ had expired. In view of that fact and
without intending to establish a precedent, the case is disposed of on the
merits."
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ing methods of removal from the particular employment.'
In
common, special, and independent school districts outside of first
class cities, the school board is authorized to discharge teachers
"for cause."' 90 No specific procedural requisites are provided.
"Cause" alone in Minnesota seems to imply at least some requirements of notice and hearing and "legal cause,"'' thus enabling a
court by certiorari or mandamus or in a salary suit to assure to
a teacher at least a substantial minimum of fairness, and that some
relation exists between the grounds of removal relied on and his
teaching capacity, or the appropriateness of his continued employment in the position involved. The court in Anderson v. Consolidated School District No. 144,192 though recognizing that the
board in discharging a teacher "for cause". "acts not only in its
executive character, but also as a quasi judicial tribunal," recognized further that "its function in the latter respect is not to be
isolated and considered apart from its responsibility as the school
manager," and that school administration involves more delicate
considerations, as to which greater administrative finality must
be accorded, than in other aspects of public administration. In this
case a teacher conceded to be otherwise extremely competent had
had three fainting spells epileptiform in nature over a seven months'
period, one occurring in her classroom and badly frightening children averaging seven and eight years of age. Few would disagree
with the court's conclusion that her dismissal was for legally sufficient cause, although the same result need not follow in the case
of a public employee among only adult associates, whose duties
are not of the type that require constant readiness for emergencies.
So also it has been deemed sufficient in the case of a high school
teacher that
"he had permitted dancing in the school building

. . . in

violation of the rules; [and that] he had, in company with students,
189Backie v. Cromwell Consol. School Dist. No. 13, (1932) 186 Minn.
38, 40, 242 N. W. 389, 390; Edie v. School Dist. No. 1 of Koochiching
County, (1931) 183 Minn. 522, 524, 237 N. W. 177.
1901 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 2815 (5). Held inapplicable to a
superintendent otherwise removable at pleasure, Jensen v. Independent
Consol. School Dist. No. 85, (1924) 160 Minn. 233, 199 N. W. 911.
' 91 See State ex rel. Furlong v. McColl, (1914) 127 Minn. 155, 160-161,
149 N. W. 11, 13; State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council of Duluth, (1893)
53 Minn. 238, 244, 55 N. W. 118, 120; State ex rel. Early v. Wunderlich,
(1920) 144 Minn. 368, 370-371, 175 N. W. 677, 678.
' 92 (Minn. 1936) 264 N. W. 784-785. The scope of review permitted by
this case has been stated in footnote 169.

REMOVAL FROM PUBLIC OFFICE IN MINNESOTA

765

attended a party until a late hour at a lumber camp under circumstances which he himself termed indiscreet." ' 3
Though customs may change in regard to the keeping of teachers
in some communities "on duty" more outside the classroom than
in it,194 the interpretation of the requirements of public morality
in this aspect can hardly be for a court so long as the ground of
removal is not a palpably ridiculous one. It must also be recognized that any sizable dissatisfaction sufficient to result in removal,
no matter how unsubstantiated, is peculiarly likely in the case of
teachers to impair further effectiveness in the same position, and
that a court proceeding, so far as the individual case is concerned.
only adds fuel to the flames.
In cities of the first class the "teachers' tenure" law of 19279'
supplants the home rule charter provisions previously applicable.
It provides a probationary period of three years after which "such
teachers as are thereupon re-employed shall . . . hold their
respective positions during good behavior and efficient and competent service and shall not be discharged or demoted" except for
specified causes' 96 after adequate hearing, public if requested, and
193 Edie v. School Dist. No. 1 of Koochiching County, (1931) 183 Minn.
522, 524, 237 N. W. 177-178. In a suit by the teacher for salary subsequent
to discharge, a judgment for defendant was reversed because of the trial
court's admission in evidence of a letter from the plaintiff's superintendent,
who was not shown to be unavailable as a witness. The court failed to
recognize that a letting down of the technical rules of evidence in an
administrative proceeding requires that they be correspondingly let down
in a cofirt proceeding to review the action of the administrative tribunal,
even as to new evidence permitted by the mode of review to be introduced
in court. See Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, (1925) 147 Md. 249, 127 Att.
850. Otherwise the court may be passing on an entirely different case
than that before the administrative tribunal whose action it is reviewing.
The decision in the Edie case may be sustained on the ground that there
was no evidence of a hearing accorded the discharged teacher. Where
this is an express or reasonably implied procedural requirement, it should
follow that the teacher has not in fact been discharged until such hearing
has been accorded, no matter how adequate may be the grounds of discharge that exist in fact.
194 See Ruth Suckow, The Folks 150-153.
1951 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs. 2935 (1-14).
1961 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., see. 2935 (6):

".

.

. (a)

Immoral

character, conduct unbecoming a teacher or insubordination. (b) Failure
without justifiable cause to teach without first securing the written release
of the school board or commissioner having the care, management or control of the school in which the teacher is employed. (c) Inefficiency in
teaching or in the management of a school. (d) Affliction with tuberculosis or other communicable disease . . . while . . . suffering from such

disability. (e) On account of discontinuance of position or lack of pupils."
If the discharge is for (e), the teacher "shall receive first consideration
for other positions in the district for which she is qualified." I Mason's
1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 2935 (13).
(a) and (c) are somewhat broader
in their phraseology than the corresponding grounds of the 1929 law for
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with the right to representation by counsel. During the three-year
probationary period "any annual contract with any teacher may,
or may not be, renewed as the school board or commissioner may
see fit," and otherwise within the period of each annual contract
"The school board or commissioner may . . . discharge or demote

a teacher" for the same causes to which removals are restricted
after the probationary period has elapsed, by giving to the teacher "a written statement of the cause of such discharge . . . at

least thirty days before . . [it] shall become effective," with
a further provision that the teacher "shall have no right of appeal
therefrom.' 1 97'

Teachers so removed within

the probationary

period may have no opportunity for review by certiorari, not because of the provision for finality1 98 but rather because the statute
simply provides that the reasons for removal be stated, without
providing an opportunity to the teacher to reply thereto.t 9°
As to teachers surviving the probationary period, the opportunities for court review are enlarged proportionately by the more
specific procedural requirements and the enumeration of the
grounds of removal as contrasted with simply "cause" in the teachers' cases so far considered. In the larger school systems of the
first class cities the relation of the teacher to the whole community
is more impersonal, and there are greater opportunities for transfer
within the same system; so that a court need not fear, to the same
extent as in a case arising in a smaller community, that a decree
reinstating the teacher will fly in the face of democracy in its
purest environment. On the other hand, because in the larger
the revocation or suspension of a teacher's certificate. Minn. Laws 1929,
ch. 388, sec. 11 (a) and (c).
1971 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 2935 (4).
19
sSee footnote 185; State ex rel. Grubbs v. Schulz, (1919) 142 Minn.
N. W. 263.
112, 171
199See State ex rel. Early v. Wunderlich, (1920) 144 Mmin. 368,
370-371, 175 N. W. 677, 6/8-079, to the effect that although "cause,"
standing alone, may imply requirements of notice and hearing, yet it is
otherwise where the statute is more specific and "points out a different
procedure" by simply requiring reasons for the removal to be stated ii]
writing; compare State ex rel. Martin v. City of Minneapaolis, (1917)

138 Minn. 182, 184, 164 N. W. 806, where the removing authority was
merely required to report the removal "in writing, together with the cause
thereof," to the local civil service commission: "We are unable to see

anything judicial or quasi-judicial in the act of making the report, even if
it be considered part of the action removing the employee."

cox v. People, (1878)

90 Il1. 186.

See also Wil-

A teacher removed within the proba-

tionary period should be able at least to compel by mandamnus the assignment in writing of one or more of the statutory causes, see the suggestion

in State ex rel. Martin v. City of Minneapolis, (1917) 138 Minn. 182, 184,
164 N. W. 806; and to recover salary up to the time at which the removal
order first becomes valid by compliance with the statutory requirements.
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systems the relation of the board of education to the teachers
employed by it is also more impersonal, the actual need of court
review, from the point of view of preserving the teacher's rights,
is somewhat less. But as to large and small school systems alike,
the opportunity for court review is here again more significant for
the restraints which knowledge of its availability may impose, than
in the actual extent to which it may approximate an adequate
balancing of interests in the individual case. The tenure law of
1927 is in a very real sense a complete civil service law as applied
to teachers in first class cities, and presents questions of legal
cognizance at least to the same extent found true of administrative
removals in previous connections, with allowance for the considerations peculiarly involved in determining teaching competency
and fitness. 0°
As already suggested, restrictions on the removal power as to
teachers may sometimes be avoided by virtue of the contractual
nature of the relation. In Hong v. Indcpendcnt School District No.
245,201 a teacher who had served five years and was under contract
for the following year underwent an appendectomy in August and
was unable to teach until October 17th, school commencing on
September 8th. Though she had notified the board prior to
September 8th that she would be unable to begin the year, and of
the temporary nature of her illness, she learned for the first time
on reporting for duty on October 17th that the board had hired
another teacher permanently in her stead. In a suit by her for
salary the court held that "The question of discharge does not
enter into our case," and that "the inability of the plaintiff to
serve for over five weeks was such nonperformance of a substantial and material part of an entire contract as to release the
defendant from further liability thereunder."20 2 Similarly in Backie
20
oCertiorari should be the proper remedy to review the adequacy ui
the hearing accorded, the sufficiency of the evidence reasonably to support
the findings, and the legal sufficiency of the grounds relied on in relation
to the grounds enumerated in the statute. Mandamus should be available
to direct reinstatement where no hearing has been accorded; and a salary
suit may be available in either situation with the opportunity to introduce
new evidence, but with no greater scope of review thereby secured, see
Anderson v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 144, (Minn. 1936) 264 N. W.
784, and without the effect of compelling reinstatement.
201(1930) 181 Minn. 309, 312-313, 232 N. W. 329, 330.
202
Holt and Dibell, J., dissented on the ground that the statute restricting removals to "cause" governed, and that "'Itwas a jury questiu:n
whether cause existed.... ." 181 Minn. 314, 232 N. W. 331. As to it
being a jury question, see Anderson v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 144,
(Minn. 1936) 264 N. W. 784.
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v. Cromwell Consolidated School District No. 13,203 involving the
discharge of a teacher for having married, the court decided
against her by reading into the terms of her contract a rule of the
school board, in force when the contract was made, providing that
a contract with a single teacher "shall be in force only at the discretion of the board after marriage." In Oxman v. Independent
School District of Duluth,2 4 at the time the school board first
adopted its rule against married teachers, the plaintiff had already
served three years and had been given a permanent appointment
not on a contractual basis. She was discharged just prior to tile
commencement of the ensuing school year for having married,
and a judgment in her favor for salary to the date of the commencement of her suit was affirmed. The briefs, conclusions of
the trial court, and opinion of the supreme court deal only with
the applicability of the 1927 tenure law to a teacher who had served
her three year probationary period prior to the date the law took
effect, and the effect of the law in dispensing with the necessity of
annual or other contracts in the cases of teachers having served
the probationary period.2 0 5 The law being held applicable, and to
dispense with the necessity of a contractual basis for a permanent
appointment, conceivably the judgment may be made to rest only
on the ground that there had been no formal removal proceeding as
required by the law. More logically it would seem to involve a
holding that marriage is not a legally sufficient ground of removal
under the tenure law, in the absence of a contractual relation expressly or impliedly containing a ban against marriage. Certainly
marriage in itself has no genuine relation to any of the grounds of
removal specifically enumerated in the law.2 00 But the decision so
construed need not necessarily prevent a school board from incorporating into permanent appointments a contractual ban against
marriage. That such appointments do not require a contractual
basis should not mean that they may not be given one within reasonable limits, so long as the effect is not to nullify the removal pro203(1932) 186 Minn. 38, 40-41, 242 N. W. 389, 390-391.
and Loring, JJ., dissenting.

Holt, Dibell,

204(1929) 178 Minn. 422, 227 N. W. 351.
205

Where the 1927 tenure law is inapplicable a written contract,
authorized by the school board at a meeting for which due notice was
given and at which a quorum was present, is in all instances necessary.
1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs. 2814, 2903; Martin v. Common School
Dist. No. 3, (1925) 163 Minn. 427, 204 N. W. 320. Where the school
board has properly elected a teacher, the chairman may be compelled by
mandamus to execute the required written contract. State ex rel. Schwartz
v. Middleton,
(1917) 137 Minn. 33, 162 N. W. 688.
20
oSee footnote 196.
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visions or frustrate the whole purpose of tenure. Nor need the
decision prevent the school board from singling out married teachers in the discontinuance of positions for lack of funds, in the
absence of binding rules making the inverse order of seniority the
basis. This is to suggest only the legal implications and not the
course of wisdom.
E. Cases Arising Under Miscellaneous Tenure Provisions
of Special Legislative or Municipal Home Rule Charters and
OrdinancesEnacted Thereunder.-Most of the cases properly falling within this subdivision have already been cited in the preceding sections and involve no separate or unique aspects of the
problem of court review. There is a compulsory civil service law
for all cities of the first class without home rule charters ;20 but
there are at present no such cities. A power to appoint municipal
court bailiffs resting in the mayor with the consent of the municipal
court judges, in the absence of an applicable removal provision, has
been held to require
"that an incumbent . . . can only be removed by the appointment
of his successor in the same way that the incumbent was originally
appointed, . . . and [that] until then the incumbent is entitled
to discharge the duties of the office and receive its salary."208
But it would seem, as a corollary to the proposition that unless
otherwise limited the removal power is in the appointing power,
that in such a case a removal by the mayor, if concurred in by the
municipal court judges or any other body sharing the appointing
power, could take effect before the actual appointment of a suc20 9
cessor.
A municipal charter provision requiring that an otherwise unrestricted "removal or discharge shall be forthwith reported in
writing, together with the cause thereof, to the [civil servicel commission and the city comptroller" is not interpreted as restricting
the removal power to "cause," but only as making mandatory the
assignment of some reason in writing.210 There is nothing "judicial
2071
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs. 1455-1478.
2O-SParish v. City of St. Paul, (1901) 84 Minn. 426, 429-430, 87 N. W.
1124,2091125-1126.
Compare Myers v. United States, (1926) 272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct.
21, 71 L. Ed. 160, holding that the power to remove a first class postmaster appointed with the consent of the Senate is in the president alone
under the constitution. Aside from the peculiar requirements of this
decision in relation to the federal administration, and wherever the removal
power follows the appointing power, it is generally held that a body

whose consent is necessary to an appointment must concur to render a
removal effective. See Mechem, Public Officers 285.
21OState ex rel. Martin v. City of Minneapolis, (1917) 138 Minn. 182,
164 N. W. 806.
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or quasi-judicial in the act of making the report." 211 and the only
way that a court may aid an employee under such a provision is
by holding in a mandamus proceeding or suit for salary that ie
has not in fact been removed if the purely procedural requirement of assigning some cause and reporting the same has not been
fulfilled. Similarly a charter provision that "the officer making the
removal shall state specific reasons therefor in writing, and the
person removed shall have an opportunity to reply in writing,"
though apparently permitting court determination "whether the
reasons for removal . . . are sufficient in law to justify the removal," does not permit a court to go behind the assigned reasons
to determine whether there is a reasonable basis for their existence
in fact; since a specific provision for only an opportunity to reply
in writing precludes the implication that might otherwise be made
of a hearing requirement.2 1 2 State ex rel. Zimrnernt v. City of
St. Paul213 involved two seemingly inconsistent charter provisions,
one to the effect that "Except as ...

otherwise provided, all mem-

bers of said police department shall hold office during the pleasure
of said board [of police]," and another authorizing the board to
dismiss members "guilty of misconduct or neglect of duty," with
requirements of notice and hearing, right to counsel, and compulsory attendance of witnesses. The court sought to harmonize
the two provisions by holding the requirements of the second
applicable only to removals allegedly for "misconduct or breach of
duty," and not to limit "the powers of the board to remove men
for other reasons of inefficiency, such as age, health, or temperament.

' 214

But in sustaining a summary removal that had not

alleged any cause at all, 2' the court thereby deprived the second
provision of any practical effect.
A change in the administrative activities of a city, or a
transfer of functions from one department to another, will not be
deemed to circumvent civil tenure provisions so long as "The
change was not a sham or subterfuge to deprive the realtor of a
position."'2 ' This principle received a rather extreme application
21"At 138 Minn. 184, 164 N. W. 807.
212State ex rel. Early v. Wunderlich, (1920) 144 Minn. 368, 370-371,
373-374, 175 N. W. 677, 678-680.
213(1900)
81 Minn. 391, 84 N. W. 127.
2
14At 81 Minn. 395-396, 84 N. W. 128.
5
21 The only cause alleged in the return to the writ of certiorari was
"the 2 good
of the service."
16 State ex rel. Culver v. Board of Public Welfare, (1928) 174 Mim.
571, 572-573, 219 N. W. 919; see also State ex rel. Nelson v. Board of
Public Welfare, (1921) 149 Minn. 322, 327, 183 N. W. 521, 523.
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in Byrne v. City of St. Paid.217 On the reorganization of the St.
Paul city government in 1914 the functions of the former department of public health were transferred to the department of public
safety. The employees of the former department were re-employed,
but as a condition of re-employment were required in advance "to
sign and deposit... a formal resignation ...

to be accepted when

the best interests of the service, in the judgment of the department, rendered it necessary." Six weeks later plaintiff's resignation was accepted, no reason being assigned. Plaintiff was denied
relief, on the theory that his resignation "was wholly voluntary,
he understood the effect of the resignation, and that the department
could accept it and thus retire him from his position at any time
it was deemed best for the service."218 It is hard to see on the
facts of the case how the resignation was "wholly voluntary ;" and
in the second place such a practice, if followed in every minor
reorganization or transfer of functions not involving a reduction
of personnel, may easily result in a complete circumvention of the
purposes of civil tenure provisions. In Gude v.City of Duluth ' "
the civil service rules provided that in the event of lay-offs in slack
times or for lack of work in particular departments employees
should be entitled to reinstatement in the order of their seniority
in service. Plaintiff had been so laid off and not reinstated, "being
excluded from the position by the employment of others to do the
work, who as to plaintiff were junior in rank in the service." The
court felt no hesitation in affirming a judgment in plaintiff's favor
for his salary for the period of exclusion, pointing out: "The proper
method of removing plaintiff from the employment was by d'rect
proceedings under the civil service regulations, and not by indirection and without charges as here attempted."220 It is submitted that the same considerations are applicable to removals
by indirection under the guise of reorganizations wherever new
employees are forthwith appointed to do the same work. In all
such instances, however, it is prerequisite to relief that the plaintiff
shall not have acquiesced without protest in his removal or
abandoned his claim to the position so as to have "resigned by
2implication."1 .
217(1917)
21

137 Minn. 235, 163 N. W. 162.

SAt 137 Minn. 237, 163 N. W. 163.
219(1919) 144 Minn. 109, 174 N. W. 614.
22OAt 144 Minn. 110, 174 N. W. 614.
22 1
Byrnes v. City of St. Paul, (1899) 78 Minn. 205, -8-209, 80 N. W.
959; on abandonment see also Schlawr v. City of St. Paul, (1916) 132
Minn. 238, 242, 156 N. W. 283, 284; State ex rel. Smallwood v. Windom,
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CONCLUSION

The Minnesota courts, as the courts of most states, play a far
more significant part in the enforcement of tenure in public office
and employment than do the federal courts in relation to the federal
civil service. 222 It is believed to be equally true that the Minnesota
(1915)

131 Minn. 401, 404-405, 155 N. W. 629, 630-631:

"But one . . .

still claiming his right to the office . . . and having and expressing a
willingness to perform its duties, may surrender the office peaceably . . .
without incurring a conclusive charge of abandonment . . . he was not
obliged to use physical force to keep it;" Larson v. City of St. Paul,
(1901) 83 Minn. 473, 478, 86 N. W. 459, 460-461; Galvin v. City of St.
Paul, (1894) 58 Minn. 475, 477, 59 N. W. 1102.
222
The federal law provides that "No person in the classified service
. . . shall be removed . . . except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of !aid service and for reasons given in writing, and the person
whose removal is sought shall have notice of the same and . . . a

reasonable time for personally answering the same in writing" (5 U.S.C.A.

sec. 652) ; and more specifically excludes as grounds of removal membership of postal employees in outside organizations not proposing to assist
them in any strike (5 U.S.C.A. sec. 652), and refusal of anyone within
the classified service to contribute to party funds or render party services
(5 U.S.C.A. sec 633 (5)). But it further provides that "no examination of
witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required except in the discretion of
the officer making the removal" (5 U.S.C.A. sec. 652), who is in all cases
the appointing officer rather than the civil service commission. See 30
Op. Atty. Gen. 79, 83. Under the federal decisions such restrictions as
are imposed have no effective sanction. It has been held that a summary

removal complying in no respect with even the minimum procedural requirements is nevertheless a removal in fact, and that an employee so removed has no right to sue for salary in the Court of Claims. Wilmeth v.

United States, (1928)

64 Ct. Cis. 368, 374-375; O'Neil v. United States,

(1921) 56 Ct. Cis. 89, 95. These decisions may perhaps be regarded as
overruled by Rathbun v. United States, (1935) 295 U. S. 602, 55 Sup. Ct.

869, 79 L. Ed. 1710.

But where the procedural requirements have been

fulfilled, the employee is entirely without recourse to courts. Eberlein v.
United States, (1921) 257 U. S. 82, 83-84, 42 Sup. Ct. 12, 66 L. Ed. 140;
(1918) 53 Ct. Cis. 466, 471-472; White v. Berry, (1898) 171 U. S. 366,
378, 18 Sup. Ct. 917, 43 L. Ed. 199; Morgan v. Nunn (C.C. Tenn. 1898)

82 Fed. 551, 553-555; United States ex rel. Taylor v. Taft, (1904)
App. D. C. 95, 98-99; Kellom v. United States, (1920)

179; Golding v. United States, (1934)

24

55 Ct. Cis. 174,

78 Ct. Cis. 682, 685: "It appearing

from the averments of the petition that every step requisite to the removal
from office of an employee of the government in the classified service
was taken by the bureau officials in the plaintiff's case, their action in
removing him from office is conclusive and is not subject to review by the
court." See also Rice, The Function of the Courts in Enforcing the
Wisconsin Civil Service Law, (1923) 2 Wis. L. Rev. 257, 260-261, fn. 12-15.
There appears to have been at one time an extra-legal practice in the
attorney general's department of reviewing informally removals from the
federal service for the purpose of recommending reinstatement to the
president if the removal was found to have been unjustified. See Eberlein v.
United States, (1921) 257 U. S. 82, 83-84, 42 Sup. Ct. 12, 66 L. Ed.
140; Wilmeth v. United States, (1928) 64 Ct. CIs. 368, 371. Sonic of
the more flagrant removals by President Harding resulted in reinstatement
through this process by President Coolidge, see 41st Report of the U. S.
Civil Service Commission, 1923-1924, 105, although without retroactive
effect.
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courts have not gone too far in the opposite direction of impairing
effective administration. 223 The extent to which they have failed
fully to effectuate the purpose of tenure provisions from the
public employees' point of view has resulted from an accurate
perception of the dangers of a too large or too technical control,
and perhaps in some degree from the "inherent nature of the sub224
ject."
The present state of the law provokes a criticism not directed
at the courts. In the first place, the occasions for removals may
become less frequent through more adequate and uniform provisions for original selection on a strictly merit non-partisan basis,
and for discipline, promotion, and transfer. Second, assuming
removal from public office to be primarily an administrative function, it requires all the more for that reason an adequate method
of administration, rendering less frequent the occasions for resort
to courts. In place of the numerous superior officers now acting
as both prosecutor and judge in the exercise of a supposedly restricted removal power, there might well be substituted a central
personnel agency in each community or public department of any
size, together with a statewide supervisory body. This need not
call for an enlargement of officialdom, but only for a better ex
officio organization of the officialdom that already exists. And
third, with the need of resort to courts thus minimized, the scope
of court review retained and the remedy or procedure of invoking
it might well be more accurately defined and made uniform as to
all classes of removal cases. Individual removal cases necessarily
involve but small remuneration to counsel, and for that reason
frequently do not secure the best of legal talent. Yet in the present
state of the law each case involves an inordinate amount of research into a broad variety of statutory provisions and the interpretations placed upon them by the courts, and into the nature
of the extraordinary remedies to ascertain the proper proceeding
to bring. It is for the legislature to choose between the civil
service principle and the spoils system. But to the extent that the
former is chosen, it is submitted that a single, state-wide, uniform
law, with a single, state-wide, uniform method of administration
and a single, uniform remedy for invoking the aid of courts, is
223
This is not to suggest that public administration in Minnesota
is entirely effective and free from criticism, but that its weaknesses are
attributable to other reasons than judicial hampering.
224

State ex rel. Mortensen v. Copeland, (1898)

77 N. W. 221, 223.

74 Minn. 371, 376,
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far preferable to the haphazard, piecemeal, and sometimes overlapping development that already has taken place. By making such
a law optional as to municipalities, and by leaving the greater part
of its administration to the local personnel agencies, the demands
of local self-government may be satisfied. 2 It is true that most
suggestions in the direction of effective public personnel administration have proved barren. Perhaps in the life of a state as of an
individual, a stage of emotional as well as of intellectual maturity
is ultimately reached. Only when that occurs will this particular
problem have been fully surmounted.
2 25

1n these respects the firemen's and policemen's civil service laws of
1929 represent a good beginning. There is no need, however, for separate
civil service commissions for fire and police departments, and these laws
might well be brought together and enlarged so as to embace public
employees generally.

